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LEBANON IN THE MIDDLE EAST SUBORDINATE SYSTEM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

NASSIB S. EID, LTC, LEBANON, ARMY
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B.A., St. Joseph University, Beirut, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983

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This thesis studies Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System. It outlines Lebanon's individuality, the people's attitudinal prisms, and their attachment to Western values and ethics, as well as their link to the hinderland through Lebanon's arabity. This study does not focus on the Arab-Israeli problem, but only looks at it as it applies to Lebanon's stability, a stability threatened during the crises of 1958 and 1975-76 and in the following years. It underscores Lebanon's uninterrupted friendly relations towards the United States,

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which in its preoccupation with major issues in the Middle East, neglected to
perceive Lebanon's individuality. Although the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
was the catalyst that brought the United States closer to Lebanon, it is hoped
that the full partnership of the United States in negotiations for peace in the
region will be a long-lasting, mutual commitment. America's understanding of
the uniqueness of Lebanon, it is believed, should serve the interests of both
Washington and Beirut in the seemingly endless turbulence of the Middle East.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the student author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
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should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

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Colonel Nassib S. Eid, Lebanon, Army, 196 pages.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a tendency to think of the Middle East
entities as twentieth century phenomena beginning with World
War II and the birth of Arab nationalism. This is not the
case for Lebanon. While it is true that Lebanon shared in
the Arab-Muslim experience, it is not simply another Arab
state. Its origins as a distinct nation and its current
personality were molded essentially by its deep historical
roots, which predated Islam by more than two millenia. The
awareness of these historical ties is a vibrant and integral
part of the make up of Lebanon, a country where the history
of Christianity and the Western connection survived the
Islamic hegemony. Lebanon's inhabitants are linked to their
environment, in part by the ties of Islam and arabity,[1]
while strongly attached to cultural and ethical values that
they share with the Western world. It is precisely for that
reason that unstable and extremely intense images of
friendliness-hostility among actors of the Middle East
subordinate system permanently threatened Lebanon's
cherished values. These vital values are also periodically,
but deeply, endangered when the Middle East subordinate
system is penetrated by an actor of the global system who

tends to play on the regional balance of power without concern for Lebanon's inc.viduality or welfare.

The United States, currently playing a new role in the Middle East since the Palestinian evacuation from Beirut, finds itself decisively committed in both diplomatic and military issues quite different from those of the past. This thesis, which intends to study the problem of Lebanon's stability within the context of the Middle East subordinate system, should serve as a timely reference to those engaged in current Middle East issues. Its aim is to provide a document that effectively helps the Lebanese political and military officials to appreciate the U.S. role in the Middle East and its concern for Lebanon and to provide guidance to the U.S. military or Middle Eastern area specialists when implementing U.S. policy with respect to Lebanon. This study does not focus on the Arab-Israeli problem but only looks at it as it applies to Lebanon's stability and integrity. If desired objectivity in this study seems to fall short, the issue should be considered as viewed through the attitudinal screen of "Lebanism"--that is, as perceived and interpreted in the light of past Lebanese experience or imagined future.

Part one will explore the legacy of the past in both chapters two and three. It will provide in chapter two an overvie. of Lebanon through history to explain the persistence of Lebanese individuality within the Middle East

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regional system and the essence of the national images and the belief systems of the Lebanese.

Chapter three will study the Lebanese Republic, the overall product of a historical, cultural, and constitutional evolution throughout the mandate system. This evolutionary process achieved effective independence on 22 November 1943 amid a national consensus that came to be called the National Pact.

Part two, in chapters four and five, will analyze the Lebanese struggle for survival, the very survival of values threatened, firstly, by the sweeping wave of Pan-Arabism under Nasser's leadership and, secondly, by the devouring Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the progressive importance of their leadership within regional and international systems.

Chapter four will build the conceptual framework which will follow closely the model of "International Crisis Behavior" (ICB) used in the extensive studies of ICB projects under the direction of Michael Brecher. The principal concepts, however, will be largely drawn from Brecher's "Framework for Analysis."[2]

Chapter five will focus on the Lebanese dimension of the Middle East Crisis of 1958.

Chapter six will examine the successive yearly events of 1975 until 1980. Its aim is to assess Lebanon's

relations within both the international and the subordinate systems, as recorded by a U.S. agency and weighted through Lebanese perception. Therefore, a matrix of friendliness-hostility relationship will be borrowed from Kenneth E. Boulding's pioneering work on "National Images and International systems."3 This framework will demonstrate analytically the incipient alliances of the actors involved in the Middle East subordinate system and their impact on Lebanon.

The last chapter will look to the actual situation in Lebanon with respect to U.S. diplomatic efforts and the use of U.S. military forces in carrying out the U.S. foreign policy with respect to Lebanon, including implementation of security assistance programs.

To avoid different interpretations or misunderstanding of terms, throughout this thesis the following definitions will be used. Any exception to this will be so noted.

- <u>Foreign policy</u> - a strategy or planned course of action developed by the decision makers of one state with regard to other states or international entities, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interests.4

- <u>Nation</u> - a social group or community that believes it belongs together. Usually the group shares a common historical and cultural background. A common language and

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common religion may strengthen the feeling of nationhood. Nationhood is often strengthened through a desire to perpetuate a common culture (or aspect of that culture) or through a desire to achieve a specific common goal.5

- National image - essentially a historical image--that is, an image which extends through time, backward into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future. The more conscious a people is of its history, the stronger the national image is likely to be.6

- National interests - the fundamental objectives and ultimate determinates that guide the decision makers of a state in forming national policy. These objectives include self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being.7

- National objectives - those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation--as opposed to the means for seeking these ends--toward which a policy is directed and efforts or resources of the nation are applied.8

- National policy - a broad course of action or statement of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.9

- Operational environment - the set of potentially relevant factors and conditions (setting) in which foreign policy decisions are taken. The raw data of that

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environment are grouped into two settings: external and internal.[10]

- Global system - the first level of analysis of the external setting. It is the total web of relationships within the international system among all actors (states, blocs, or organizations); however, neither all actors nor all interactions are equally important.[11]

- Subordinate system - is the second level of analysis of the external setting. It is characterized by six conditions: (1) delimited scope, with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) at least three actors; (3) objective recognition by most other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the global system; (4) self-identification as such; (5) units of power relatively inferior to units in the dominant system, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) greater effect on the subordinate system by penetration from the dominant system than the reverse.[12]

- Psychological environment - the context of psychological predispositions: first, societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy; and second, personality factors of the decision makers, which are not generated by their role occupancy. Together these influences constitute the screen or prism through which elite perceptions of the operational environment are filtered.[13]

- _Elite_ _images_ - perceptions of reality upon which decision makers act. Image and reality may coincide or may diverge. In any event, all decision makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be conditioned by them in their behavior on foreign or domestic issues. Elite images are not less real than the reality of their environment and are quite relevant to an analysis of decision flow.[14]

CHAPTER I

NOTES

[1]Arability is used in the sense of the Arabic word 'uruba, which is in fact viewed by Arabs as the objective system of such common factors as Arabic language, history, geography, and culture, among others, from which the Arabic nation is issued. It is preferred to Arabism, which connotes militancy.

[2]Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven: University Press, 1972), pp. 1-20.

[3]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 422-31.

[4]Jack C. Plano and Roy Holton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[5]National Security Affairs Committee, Department of Joint/Unified Operations, Glossary (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982-83).

[6]Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," p. 424.

[7]Plano and Holton, International Relations Dictionary.

[8]U.S. Department of Defense, JCS Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC, 1 June 1979).

[9]Ibid.

[10]Brecher, Foreign Policy System of Israel, pp. 3, 4.

[11]Ibid., p. 5.

[12]Ibid., p. 7.

[13]Ibid., p. 11.

[14]Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

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PART I

THE LEGACY OF THE PAST

CHAPTER II

PERSISTENCE OF LEBANESE INDIVIDUALITY

An objective look at the evolution of Lebanon as a
state, on the Middle East regional scene, shows that the
sixteenth century is likely to be the most adequate period
to start studying the process of its political mutation.
However, the earlier centuries are judiciously considered to
be an integral component of the essence of the national
images. It is there where the identity of the Lebanese
people have most of their roots. Subsequently, the best way
to examine the persistence of Lebanon's individuality would
be to start from the foundations.

The Foundations

The actual name of Lebanon[1] has always been
associated with the mountain on the eastern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea. It is frequently mentioned in the Bible
by name or by implication when referring to the snowy
summits or the forested flanks of the mountain. The
perennial mountain provided natural resources and shelter
for the earliest inhabitants.

1. The Semites: One of the earliest semitic
people, the Canaanites inhabited the shores and flourished
around the natural ports along the eastern coast of the
Mediterranean Sea. The city-port of Gubla[2] was the first to

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be noticed for its trade link with the people of the Nile. The Canaanites expanded their activity and established commercial and cultural relations with the Greeks, to whom they brought the alphabet, the papyrus, and the purple dye. The Greeks referred to them as Phoenicians, and as such they entered the Greek mythology[3] and penetrated the main gate of history. Unlike their neighbors (to the east, the Aramaeans centered around Damascus, which became the land of Aram;[4] the "people of the sea," became the Philistines; and the Hebrews created their kingdom under the scepter of King David), the Phoenicians, reflecting the image of the Hellenic cities, remained organized as city-states on the coastal plain of Lebanon. Safe and independent, the Phoenicians prospered. In this "Golden Age"[5] they established colonies, such as Carthage, whose influence reached Europe.[5] Sidon and Tyre reigned over the Mediterranean Sea, which became, for several centuries, a Phoenician domain.

The inexorable course of invasions reappeared in the eleventh century with the Assyrians rising as an imperial power. Reaching Phoenicia, they received tribute from and granted autonomy to the native kings. The most famous are the Kings of Tyre Hiram[6] and Elu-eli[7] (my God is God).

The Assyrian Empire cracked at Nineveh in 612 B.C.; the "city of blood" fell under the assaults of Nabopolassar

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(625-605 B.C.), King of Babylon. His son Nebuchadnezzar, the future successor, dismantled the Kingdom of Judah (586 B.C.) and pushed towards the city-states of Phoenicia. The island part of the city of Tyre, where the Tyrians retreated, resisted a thirteen-year siege (585-572 B.C.). Finally, without being defeated, Tyre exchanged selected hostages to gain autonomy under the Phoenician King Baal.

The decisive victory of the Persian Cyrus (550-539 B.C.) over the arrogant Babylon (539 B.C.) drew the curtain on the semitic period to open on the Indo-European era. Phoenicia would never again reach its Golden Age, but left a heritage to the world and a marvelous image that Lebanese historians and poets have kept forever alive.[8]

2. The Indo-Europeans. Darius (521-685), King of Persia, organized his empire into twenty satrapies; the fifth province comprised Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Cyprus. Sidon[9] became the capital of the province and was granted the privilege to function as an autonomous city-state. The other Phoenician city-states, Tyre, Aradus, and Byblos also were allowed native kings and enjoyed identical autonomy and prosperity.

Under the reign of the new Persian King Artaxerxes (359-338 B.C.), the four cities of Phoenicia were organized into a federation seated at Tripoli;[10] the three-hundred-delegate council held annual meetings to discuss internal matters. In 351 B.C., the council proclaimed total

independence; the whole coast revolted against Persia. Artaxerxes, at the head of his army, personally retaliated, destroying Sidon and Tyre. Thus, Persian hegemony survived only a few years.

The victory of Alexander the Great over Darius III in 333 B.C. opened the road to the Hellenic advance. The Phoenician city-states welcomed the Macedonians. Arriving at Tyre, Alexander wanted to enter

Map 1

the Temple of Melkart, the Supreme God of Phoenicia. Tyre denied the invader this honor and had to fight valiantly a seven-month siege. It succumbed to Alexander in mid-July 332 B. C. with very few survivors. With the death of Alexander the Great, his large empire was soon dismantled into four states under the rule of four generals, Ptolemy (Egypt), Seleucus (Babylonia), Antigonus (Asia Minor) and

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Antipar (Macedonia). Control of the Phoenician Coast shifted several times between Egypt and Babylonia until the collapse of Greek hegemony.

The Roman Domination reached the Orient in the year 64 B.C., when Pompey organized the "Provincia Syria," including Lebanon and Palestine. The city-states of Phoenicia, by the year 27 B.C., found themselves gravitating in the orbit of Rome. In such a situation, Lebanon was exposed to Christianity. Leaving Gennesaret,[11] "Jesus withdrew to the region of Tyre and Sidon" and cured a Canaanean girl. People

SYRIA
AS A
ROMAN PROVINCE

Map 2

from South Phoenicia came to Galilee to hear and see Him. Coming from Greece, Paul called on some friends in Tyre, which became the seat of an archbishopric. By the third century Lebanon was almost completely Christianized and the ten-year persecution (303-313) came to an end with the triumph of Christianity under the rule of Constantine the Great. From this moment the Lebanese shared all the aspects

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of the Christian Commonwealth of Byzantium and the Roman Empire. Berytus (Beirut) became a cultural center in the fifth century. Its "School of Law" gave the basis to the "corpus juris civilis" of Justinian; the school was completely destroyed in an earthquake in 555. One century later, the Arab Muslim conquest resulted in the defeat of Byzantium (633-640) and the inclusion of Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon within the dominion of Islam.

3. The Empires of Islam. Since the earliest years of the Arab conquest (632) Lebanon had been living in an environment of empires that had at least a common major component: Islam. These were the empires of Medina (632-661), the Ummayads (661-750), and the Abbasids (750-1258). The Fatimids (969-1171) was concurrent with the Abbasids with Cairo as its capital. All these empires were based on revelations to the Prophet Muhamad, who, upon his "Hijra" (flight) (622) to Medina, secured a genuine political organization with the wealthy Jewish inhabitants of Yathrib:

> This is the charter established by Muhamad, the Prophet, the Messenger of God, among the Believers and the Muslims of Quraish and the inhabitants of Yathrib 12 (Medina) and those who followed, who found shelter near them, and fought with them. They all constitute a unique UMMA (nation) at the exclusion of other peoples.

This could have been the first step in history for the foundation of a state on modern constitutional terms;[12]

however, ulterior motives subverted that unique experience and made of Medina (the city) a theocratic state.

Relying on a flow of revealed verses, after successful, limited military operations, Muhamad implemented without misgiving the distinctive traits of his authority. The authority comes from God: "God granteth His authority to whom He Pleased" (S. II, v. 267); "Say: O God! Lord of Power (and rule) Thou givest Power to whom Thou pleased and Thou strippest off power from whom Thou pleasest" (S. III, v. 26). The authority belongs to God: "He to Whom belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth . . ." (S. XXV, v. 2) Muhamad, His Messenger on earth had the authority to rule, not according to pre-established laws or customs, but according to the only truth that God revealed: "O ye who believe! Obey God and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the last day . . ." (S. IV, v. 59). Therefore the person in charge should be granted the authority from God. He shall always have to rule according to the laws revealed to Muhamad. This transcendental and exclusive aspect of authority was tempered through consultations: "and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then when thou take a decision, put thy trust in God." (S. III, v. 159). Although these consultations were

recommended, they did not appear to be a decisive issue; the second part of the verse is clear. God, being the source of authority, His will and legitimate desire to discriminate among "unbelievers" was made clear. For the Qur-an, the only citizens were the Muslims. Jews and Christians (the dimmis) were the "people of the book" (ahl al-kitab) who were willing to live under the protection of Islam: "Fight those who do not believe, not in God nor the last day, or hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, [even if they are] of the people of the book until they pay the "jizya" (tax) with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued" (S. IX, v. 29). Therefore the people of the book were thus tacitly willing to submit to the Islamic ideal being enforced in the Muslim state, saving only their personal liberty of conscience as regarded themselves. This precept, implemented under the Prophet, will be the predominant relation of subordination that Christians and Jews had to have with the Islamic state growing from the city-state Medina to become one of the world's largest empires.

b. To the empire of Medina. Under the leadership of the wise Caliphs,[13] an abundant "Sunna" came to complete the revelation of the Qur-an. It is a wide range of models to be strictly observed. All Believers are requested to behave according to the Sunna by imitation or at least by

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adaptation. Therefore, the state's analytical model, derived from the Qur-an and the Sunna, defines the goal of the state, regulates its activity and ascribes the same source for law and authority:

- The goal of the state is the reign of God on earth. The "jihad," one aspect of that need, may be the holy war; it encompasses every religious or informational activity to spread the word of God as revealed to His Messenger.

- To implement the reign of God, the governors cannot deviate from the "Straight Way," "The Way of God to Whom belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on earth. Behold (how) all affairs tend towards God!" (S. 62, v. 53). The governors can make their own laws, standards, and institutions, but the ultimate validity test is God's will as revealed in His revelation (Qur-an, Sunna, Shari'a).

- The state is an institution established upon the recommendation of the divine law which also provided it the organic rules to function and the possibility to make its own laws. Therefore state and law are linked in a kind of mutual filiation to fuse together in the Qur-an.

These were the traits of the Muslim state in its earliest years under the Prophet's immediate successors. Muawiya, the first Caliph of the Ummayads dynasty, found

immediately upon the conquest of Syria the occasion to widely apply this policy.

a. The Ummayads. Once the Ummayads had conquered "Provincia Syria," they divided it into four districts: Damascus, Hims, Jordan, and Palestine; Lebanon was attached to Damascus. These decisions were taken in reunions or meetings such as "the Jabiyah Conference" in which final policy concerning the implementation of the "Dimmi" status had been taken;

> But Lebanon the mountain offered no attraction to warriors, government officials, Bedouins or semi-bedouins from Arabia. Agriculture was below the dignity of such men. Snow was no favorite of theirs. Nor was mountain warfare ever palatable to Arabians."[14]

Therefore the Christians withdrew to the strongholds in the Mount-Lebanon. The Arab Caliphate reached the summit of its glory under Abdul Malik (685-705), creating a large empire. Meantime in Lebanon, Yuhanna Marun (Joanes Maro, d. 707), first Patriarch of the Christians of Mount-Lebanon, became

> the hero and founder of the new nation cradled on the banks of the Qadisha and in the shades of cedars. Under his leadership, the Maronite community developed into an autonomous nation holding with one arm the Moslem caliph and with the other the Byzantine emperor.[15]

Justinian II sent his troops against the Maronites in Lebanon (694); Yuhanna defeated them at Amyun. Since, isolated, "their humble nation survived the empire of Constantinople, which persecuted it."[16] The Maronites not

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only survived and
preserved their language,
but in their sectarian
attitude wrote the
Karshuni.17 Lebanon
appeared to be a rallying
point for the Christians
of the neighborhood; the
Melkites, the Nestorians,
the Chaldanaeans, and
others joined them.

MOSLEM CONQUEST OF
SYRIA AND LEBANON
Showing the Military Districts
and the route followed by
Khālid ibn-al-Walid

b. The Abbasids:
Successors of the
Ummayads caliphs, the
Abbasids distinguished

Map 3

themselves by excessive despotism. Under their dominion,

the population suffered patiently; the Christians, who had

to endure extortion and unfair taxation, rebelled. The

retaliation was without discrimination. But one voice was

heard in protest: the voice of Iman Uzai, the voice of the

"dimma" (conscience) of the Islam, would not die:

> The expulsion from Mt. Lebanon of dhimmis who
> were not a party to the rebellion whose perpetrators
> you have either killed or sent back home has no
> doubt been a subject of your knowledge. How then
> could the many be punished for the crime of the few
> and how could they be expelled from their homes and
> lands so long as God Himself hath decreed, "Nor doth
> any sinning one bear another's burden?" Surely no
> decree has a greater claim on our final acceptance

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and permanent obedience. And no command is more worthy of observance and consideration than that of the Messenger of Allah, who proclaimed: "He who oppresses one bound to us by covenant and charges him with more than he can do, verily I am the one to overcome him by argument."[18]

Adjacent to the Maronite stronghold, the persecuted Druzes settled in the center of Mount-Lebanon. They are an offshoot of Islam who followed the enigmatic Al-Hakim (999-1021), but are named after Al-Darazi, who proclaimed the God-Hakim dogma. The last disciple, Baha-al-Din[19] declared that the people around him were unworthy of the truth, and since then "the door has been closed"[20] to new members. Druzes and Christian Maronites became inseparable from the history of Mount-Lebanon.

The following four centuries were a period of Western penetration: the Crusades. The Crusade states naturally favored

Map 4

the indigenous Christians and allowed the Maronites to establish excellent links with the Latins and to initiate a longlasting friendship with Italy, France, and the Pope. Culture, education, and a kind of national awakening

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flourished in the land of the Maronites. However, with the demise of the crusade states, the region reverted to Islamic control and a period of stagnation for its Christian inhabitants. It was not until the 16th century that we find the re-emergence of local political consciousness.

B.   The Princes of the Mountain

      1.   The Ma'nid Emirate (1516-1697) or the Ma'n Emirs

        a.   Fakhreddin I (1516-1697).   On 24 August 1516, Selim, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire defeated the Egyptian Mameluks and established his headquarters in Damascus. A delegation of Lebanese Emirs came to greet him; Fakhreddin distinguished himself in this prayer:

> O Lord, perpetuate the life of him whom Thou hast chosen to administer Thy domain, installed as the successor (Caliph) of Thy covenant, empowered over Thy worshippers and Thy land and entrusted with Thy precept and Thy command; he who is the supporter of Thy luminous legislation and the leader of Thy righteous and victorious nation, our lord and master of our favours, the commander of the believers. . . . May God respond to our prayer for the perpetuation of his dynasty, in happiness and felicity and in might and glory! Amen.[21]

Sultan Selim, very impressed, confirmed him as "Sultan of the mountain," thus maintaining the privilege of autonomy that Lebanese Emirs previously enjoyed. His son Emir Korkmaz had succeeded to him upon his death (1544).

        b.   Korkmaz (1544-85), Emir of the Druze mountain, had enmity against the Turks and challenged the authority of the representative of the Sublime porte. He was subject to

massive punitive expeditions, using an incident in Jun Akkar as an excuse, and died in flight from advancing Ottoman Turks.

      c.   Fakhreddin II (1590-1633).   To hide from the Turks, Korkmaz'son Fakhreddin was entrusted to the Maronite family of al-Khazin at Ballune, in the Kesrwan. He remained under Maronite protection until his majority. In 1590, Druze by blood, Maronite by education, he took charge of his Emirate; it is under his impulse that Mount-Lebanon, within its natural geography, acquired a politically significant territory (see map 5), for since then, the interest of Europe in Mount-Lebanon has never stopped. During forty-three years, Fakhreddin oriented his efforts to accomplish his national objectives: (1)   "building up a greater Lebanon," (2) "severing the last ties between it and Ottoman Turkey," and (3) "setting it well on the path of 'modernism' and progress,"22   through an adequate national policy closely interrelated to a foreign policy.

National Policy of Fakhreddin:

-- To strengthen the authority of his Emirate: In the first part of his reign he neutralized his father in law and main enemy Yusuf Sayfa in two battles, at the Dog River (1598) and at Junieh (1603).

-- To win the allegiance of local feudals, he allied himself with the Harfush and Shihabs. By marriage he won

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the Druzes of the opposing camp; the Maronites were already his friends.

    --To strengthen the economical infrastructure, he controlled the Bekaa high plateau by alliances and he annexed the Port of Beirut in 1603 to his authority.

    -- "Internal policy rested on three pillars of security, prosperity, and non-sectarianism."23

    -- The Prince advocated freedom of beliefs and tolerance; the Emirate functions became an easy access to Christians. At this time the Maronites spread deep into the Shuf and the South.24

    -- He brought from Italy civil and agricultural engineers. Commerce and agriculture were the two pillars of the Emirate.

    -- The army was the most powerful army of the region and the best disciplined. Its components were a standing army of voluntary Lebanese and mercenaries (40,000). In urgent matters (decided within a council of nobles) all Lebanese from all religions and classes responded. "In all he could command a hundred thousand men";25 their military equipment was imported from Florence.

Foreign Policy of Fakhreddin II:

    -- In his relations with Europe the Lebanese Prince was ready to help the Europeans26 to achieve their traditional interests in the Levant, which was the conquest

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of the "holy lands," and, in fact, he started positive actions in the South, securing the roads as far as Galilee on the way to Jerusalem.27   He signed a treaty with Ferdinand I, grand duke of Toscany (Florence, 1608). He established relations with the King of Spain and Pope Paul V in accordance with Lebanon's national interests.28 "Of all the nations the Florentines were the most favoured one."29

-- With the Sublime Porte, the Prince maintained apparent good relations. He was moving toward the goal set before his eyes. He wrote, "the goal being the full independence of our country and its sovereignty, we are resolved that no promise of reward or threat of persecution shall in the least affect us."30   In 1624, Fakhreddin was acknowledged the undisputed master of the area. But his renewed relations with Europe, his huge, well-equipped army, and his "leaning toward Christians attracted once more the suspicions" of the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, in 1633 a military expedition was ordered; eighty thousand men were converging on Mount-Lebanon from three directions and a fleet of twenty-two galleys attacked the ports from the West. Captured in February 1635, the old rebel was taken to Constantinople, where two mutes strangled him near a mosque on 13 April 1635; his sons who had fought with him were also executed or killed. The youngest son was raised in the Ottoman environment, becoming the Sultan's ambassador to India.31

Fakhreddin's heritage was the first sketch of Lebanon's architecture; the perennial mountain deployed to its natural limits, as an autonomous entity along the Mediterranean Sea. He established a tradition of Maronite-Druze union which became the mainstay of Lebanon's autonomy as an Ottoman province.

2. The Shihab Emirate (1697-1840). A period of political instability, including a civil war among the Druze discretely encouraged by the Ottomans, followed the death of Fakhreddin II. The Emirate, under close surveillance of the Ottomans, was restored to the Maans; their lineage came to an end in 1697.

a. The new Emirs of Lebanon, the Shihabs, more capable on the whole than their predecessors, were better able to deal with rival factions and internal upheavals. Under Bashir I (1697-1707) internal peace was achieved, and the Emir was able to extend his influence southward into northern Palestine. Ottoman intervention soon followed the extention of Shihab power but was firmly met by Haydar Shihab (1707-1732), who defeated the Ottoman backed Druze faction. The defeat of this faction in 1711 firmly established the power of the Shihabs, and temporarily ended the dissensions among the Druze.

Emir Melhem (1732-54) succeeded his father and the same year defeated the Wali of Damascus and regained

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possession of the fertile Bekaa; Jabal-Amel followed and in 1749, Beirut reincorporated Mount-Lebanon and became the winter capital of the Emirate. In 1754, Melhem abdicated to study Islam; his sons, Yussof and Kasem, converted to Christianity and integrated the Maronite community. His two brothers competed to assume succession; the sixteen-year competition terminated when one of them, Mansour, declared to the feudal assembly that he restituted the Emirate to the legal heir, his nephew Yussof. The "Sick Man on the Bosphore" could not disapprove. It was the first time that a Christian Prince, vassal of the Ottoman Empire, had power over Christian and Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.

Emir Yussof (1770-88) maintained the integrity of the Lebanese territory in all its essential geographical elements: the coast, the mountain, and the Bekaa. Beirut prospered under his rule.

b. Emir Bashir II (1788-1840). Elected at age twenty-one, Bashir II steadily moved "toward an enlarged and independent Lebanon, defiance of Constantinople and progress toward modernization."[32] Bashir II, some called him the Great, used the most controversial methods and means to reach his goals; he was the ruler of the Mountain, Wadi Taym, Baalbak, Bekaa plains, Jabal Amel, and the region of Jubail. His legendary authority was strengthened by his physical appearance. "With his patriarchal look, bushy eyebrows half-shading large, piercing, sparkling eyes and

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with his long, undulating beard, inspired awe and reverence."[33] To promote central authority, he developed an administration to be in charge of the state functions, organized the judiciary system, established a police to support the judicial system; sometimes reference is made to his "secret service"[34] men. He promoted socio-economical life, public health,[35] public constructions, agriculture and trade, and last but not least education and culture.[36] "Christian by baptism, Moslem in matrimony,"[37] Bashir II maintained a liberal religious policy and a national policy giving the supremacy to the social over the political.

Map 5

Bashir II's rule ended in January 1840 amid insurgencies that brought the Emirate of Mount-Lebanon to decline, and ignited two decades of turmoil. On 16 January,

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1842, the Ottomans announced the fall of the Shihabs. The
Christian Emirate of the country was declared at an end and
a Muslim was appointed to government in Lebanon. The end of
Maronite-Druze solidarity on which Lebanon's autonomy rested
was a distinct triumph of Ottoman policy.

C. The Twin Qaymaqamat

   1. Vulnerable Structure. The new political
structure of the twin Qaymaqmat gave the Maronite a district
in Mount-Lebanon as well as the Druze.38   The first
innovation of the setting was to strengthen the communities'
political status without resolving the Lebanese problem.
Secondly, the Ottoman Empire seized the opportunity to
abolish the "Emirate of the Mountain" without European
protests. In fact, the European powers at that time were
looking closely into the internal affairs of the Empire to
bring the Sublime Porte to grant the Christians political
and civic rights equal to the rights of Muslims within the
Ottoman Empire.[39]

   During the two decades of the twin Qaymaqamat, civil
disturbances shook the mountain; the third "movement"[40]
started within the Maronite Qaymaqamat in 1858 as a social
revolution. The peasants, encouraged by the clergy,
revolted against their traditional feudal lords; they were
seeking less taxes and equal rights without favoritism. The
success of this social awakening under a nonfeudal Maronite

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leadership expanded to reach the Druze district; the Druze retaliated against the Maronite peasants. The unexpected complicity[41] of the Ottoman officials extended the massacre to all Christians, thus largely contributing to the horror of genocides perpetrated throughout the entire country, and rapidly spread with increasing intensity to culminate in Damascus with further extermination of Christians.

The news reached Europe, and for the first time in history, people outside the region knew that the Oriental Christians were victims of collective massacres.[42] The great powers of Europe, who were sponsoring the twin Qaymaqamat, found themselves under moral obligation to intervene in Lebanon.

2. International Interest. Lebanon's relationship with Europe commenced since several centuries;[43] friendship and alliance existed with the Tuscany Duchy. The Papacy, still a temporal state, had sent delegates to Lebanon and received Maronites in Rome. The Europeans were seen everywhere in Lebanon; the news of genocide reached every capital and the public opinion was galvanized. Under such a pressure from their public opinion, the European powers (Great Britain,[44] France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria), the associated protectors of the Lebanese question, decided on two actions. Both of them, subjects of protocols to be transmitted through diplomatic channels to

His Highness the Sultan.[45]   The first protocol assured the
Ottomans that the contracting European powers were not
seeking territorial advantages, they were acting according
to article 9 of the Treaty of 30 March 1856, stating that
serious administrative matters should be implemented to
improve the future existence of the Christians within the
Ottoman Empire.   The Second protocol stated in its first
article that a detachment not exceeding twelve thousand
European soldiers, had to be sent to the Levant to re-
establish tranquility.   This mission was assigned to the
Emperor Napoleon III, who consented to promptly provide half
of the troops; names of ulterior participants had to be
transmitted through diplomatic channels (Art. 2).   The
Signatories had also to maintain sufficient naval forces to
sustain the efforts of the troops (Art. 4) for a period of
six months (Art. 5).

3.   International intervention.   On 16 August the
French troops landed in Beirut as members of a European
expedition.   Meanwhile, the Sultan, Abdul-Majid, assured
Napoleon III and Queen Victoria in personal letters that
severe measures would be taken against the parties guilty of
the massacres.   In fact, the Sultan's Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Fuad Pasha, came to Lebanon and Damascus and
carried out drastic judgments.   He court-martialed those
responsible to sentences of death or exile.   The guilty

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parties were hanged in public; the Turkish Governor Ahmad Pasha and "fifty-six other public officials and civilian offenders" were thus hanged.[46]   The Druze involved were not judged; the Christian commission that had drawn up the list of Druze offenders, did not show up to testify against them.

The judicial measures had to be followed by administrative changes to ensure security and stability. Both missions, assigned to the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, had to be conducted in coordination with a delegation representing major European powers.   The French troops, having not much to do, spent their spare time helping people to recover.   The duration of their mission had been extended somewhat, so that the new status of Mount-Lebanon came into existence.   In June 1861, mission accomplished, the military sailed from Beirut.

D. Mutasarrifat Mount-Lebanon (1860-1920)

1. The European Commission. Upon completion of legal procedures against the offenders in Mount-Lebanon, the European powers delegated a commission of five representatives to elaborate, in participation with the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Pasha, the adequate administrative Statute for Lebanon.   Meeting in Beirut since 26 September 1860, the commission moved to Constantinople to negotiate the final regulations.   On 9

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June 1861, the negotiations came to a conclusion; protocol and organic statute of Mount-Lebanon became effective. The Sultan Ali Pasha himself and the five delegates signed both documents. The organic statute, amended on 6 September 1864, changed the system of representation from parity to proportional representativity within the council, thus giving small advantage to the Maronites. The organic statute of Lebanon remained in force until the outbreak of World War I; it juridically determined the external relations and the internal structure of Lebanon's individuality.

2. The protocol outlined the international committment of Turkey and major European powers to Lebanon's autonomy.[47] This recognized autonomy was extended to the Christian governor-general of Mount-Lebanon.[48] The Sultan appointed him for three years, after the consent of the European powers. Because the Sultan had no more authority to relieve him without trial once he was put in charge, this governor had the opportunity to rule without fear--in principle--according to the best interests of Lebanon and in conformity to the organic statute.[49]

3. The organic statute, with its eighteen articles, defined the internal structure of Lebanon:

- The geographic delimitation of the country was stripped; the ports of Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli remained under direct Ottoman authority, also the fertile Bekaa, and

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Wadi-Taym, the homeland of
the Shihabs, the Princes of
the Mountains50 (see map 6).

Map 6

- The governor had
the executive authority; he
had his own judiciary system
and maintained a local
police.   This armed force
was strong: seven policemen
for every one thousand
inhabitants (art. 14).

- A representative
council of twelve members
(Art. 2) assisted the
governor. Every two years,
renewal of its third was
requested; existing members could be re-elected (Art. 10).
The repartition of the seats within the council followed
communitarian and regional criteria in the proportion of
seven Christians to five Muslims and Druzes.51

- The abolition of all feudal privileges had
strengthened the achievement of the Maronite peasants not
only in the Kesrwan, but also in all cazas of central and
meridional Lebanon.   The clergical hierarchy remained
untouched.   "Of all the prelates of the Ottoman Empire the

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Maronite Patriarch was the only one who operated without formal authorization from the Porte and he persisted in his refusal to seek investiture from that source."[52]

Despite the loss of its ports and fertile plains Mount-Lebanon "enjoyed a period of cultural flourish and economic prosperity and achieved a state of security and stability unattained by any Ottoman province, European or Asian."[53]

CHAPTER II

NOTES

[1]Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 13.

[2]The Semitic name Gebal (mountain) lives in the modern jubail (little mountain); its Greek name Byblos came to mean papyrus book and lives in the word Bible.

3Europa, daughter of Agenor, King of Tyre, was the Phoenician princess carried off by Zeus in the form of a white bull. The continent carries her name, as well as Cadmus, Adonis, and Astarte.

4Ancient name of Syria.

[5]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 94.

61 Kings 5:1, 2, 5, 7, 8. Friendly relationship with King Solomon.

[7]King of Tyre, he withstood a five-year siege that ended with the death of the attacker Shalmanasser (722) on honorable terms. In his name there is a reference to El, the creator, the father of Gods.

[8]See the works of the two contemporaries, the poet Said Akl and the historian May Murr.

[9]Gen. 19:15; To Canaan were born, first Sidon, ...

[10]Juxtaposition of three cities (polis), each consisting of Sidonians, Tyrians and Aradians.

[11]Gennesaret is the biblical name of the lake Tiberiax, Matthew 15:21; for more, see Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp. 206-7.

[12]Muhamad sought their support so that his followers would not be considered as immigrant refugees. For more on the evolution of the constitutional concept, see E. Rabbath, La Formation Historique du Liban Politique et Constitutionnel (Beirut, Lebanon: P.U.L., 1973), pp. 11-52.

[13]The Wise Caliphs (also the Orthodox Califs) were the first four successors of Muhamad as temporal and spiritual authorities; they are Abu-Bakr (632-4), Omar ibn alkhattab (634-44), Uthman al Yakuby (644-56), and Ali ibn abu Taleb (656-61). The "Sunna" is the total pattern of traditional practice of Muhamad as set forth in the above periods.

[14]Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp. 241, 244.

[15]Ibid., p. 249. For more on Yuhanna Marun, see Bibliotheca orientalis, vol. 1 (Rome, 1719), pp. 496-520.

[16]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 249, cited from Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury, vol. 5 (London, 1898), pp. 156-57.

[17]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 345. When Arabic language was used in their church literature, it was written in Syriac characters; a practice that prevailed until the 20th century.

[18]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 269. The verse of the Qur-an included in this citation is according to the translation used throughout this thesis (S. VI, v. 164) "Every soul draws the need of its act on none but itself; no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another."

[19]Because he lived in concealment the date of his death might be a little after his last apostle (1042).

[20]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 260.

[21]Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 357, cited according to three different sources.

[22]Ibid., p. 324.

[23]Ibid., p. 376.

[24]Ibid., p. 377.

[25]Ibid., pp. 375, 383.

[26]Ibid., p. 380. "The unusual presence of a Druze prince in Europe seeking cooperation against a common foe gave rise to the legend that the Druzes were descendents of a crusading colony founded by a count de Dreux."

[27]Ibid., p. 374. The presumed road to Jerusalem was by sea to the two ports of Beirut and Sidon, then only one hundred miles to Jerusalem from South Lebanon as departure base.

[28]Ibid., p. 377. The narrow coastal plain and the sea ports were judiciously considered by the Prince vital to Lebanon as well as the full independence.

[29]Ibid., p. 376. Venetians came next.

[30]Ibid., p. 380.

[31]Ibid., pp. 383-85.

[32]Ibid., p. 412.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid., p. 414.

[35]One of his sophisticated intervention was the "quarantina" (Italian for Quarantine).

[36]The pioneer American missionary arrived at Beirut in 1823; Pliny Fish, member of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, was a teacher; he died in 1825 at the age of thirty-one.

[37]Ibid., p. 417.

[38]Ibid., pp. 433-41, two decades of civil disturbances.

[39]The Ottoman Empire included large Christian communities in Eastern Europe - the inhabitants of the Balkans; they could not hold positions of responsibility and administrative functions. In the Ottoman reform of 1856, (Hatti Humayun) the Sultan recognized the principle of equality between his Christian and Moslem subjects.

[40]The first "harakat" (movement) was in 1841; it ended the Emirate period and gave place to the twin Qaymaqmat in 1863. The second "movement" took place in 1865; it paved the way for the Christian genocide in 1860. For details, see Salibi, pp. 40-52, 80-104, and Hitti, pp. 433-41.

[41]The Ottoman garrison commander would offer the Christian population asylum, ask for surrender of arms, and then see them slaughtered in the local Serai. Hitti, p. 438. These experiences gave rise to the saying "we would sooner be plundered by Druzes than protected by Turks." Cited in Hitti, p. 434, from Chruchill, Druzes, p. 52; Jessup, p. 162.

[42]The Christians having equal rights (since 1856) within the Ottoman Empire became a potential threat to Muslim Fundamentalists.

[43]See above, Crusaders era and Fakhreddin rule.

[44]Great Britain was at first reluctant; the reason was that Her Majesty's Counsul in Beirut was traditionally supporting the Druzes to counterbalance France's prestige among the Christians on one hand and on the other hand accelerate the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Sick Man of Europe.

[45]All documents pertaining to the turmoils of 1860 are in vol. VI of the Recueil, Testa. Cited in Rabbath, Le Liban Politique, pp. 206-20.

[46]K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York: Praeger 1966), p. 108. He brings the number of officers and soldiers to 111; they were shot after trial, in which they were found guilty of participating in the massacres or gross neglect of duty.

[47]Italy adhered to the protocol in 1867, raising the number of guarantors to seven.

[48]Yusuf Karam, a Maronite from Ihden had cherished the aspiration of being nominated as governor-general; he symbolized Lebanese nationalism. Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 442.

[49]The declaration of the Sultan, which is an integral part of the protocol, deals with this subject. Cited in Rabbath, Le Liban Politique, p. 445.

[50]Sidon requested to reincorporate Mount-Lebanon, and the governor also requested the Bekaa reattachments to the Lebanon.

[51]Batroun and Kesrwan, 2 Maronites; Jezzin, 1 Maronite, 1 Druze, 1 Sunni; the Metn, 1 Maronite, 1 Greek Orthodox, 1 Druze, 1 Shia; Shouf, 1 Druze; Koura, 1 Greek Orthodox; Zahleh, 1 Greek Catholic.

52Hitti, <u>Lebanon</u> <u>in</u> <u>History</u>, p. 446.

53Ibid., p. 477.

CHAPTER III

THE MANDATE SYSTEM

In the aftermath of World War I, Lebanon found
itself in a confused operational environment. The Arabs had
revolted and moved to liberate Damascus: an operation that
made Lawrence of Arabia famous and traced the British
support. In fact, Sir Henry McMahon, British High
Commissioner at Cairo, had had a secret correspondence with
His Highness the Sharif Hussein of Mecca; it aimed "to
acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all
economic enterprises in the Arab countries . . ." and to
confirm "that His Majesty's Government would welcome the
resumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of true race."1 On
the other hand the European Powers were planning for
redefining their spheres of influence over the Turkish
Empire; the secret agreement (Sykes-Picot) reached in 1916
anticipated the prominent position of France and England in
the Levant (Phoenicia).2 Also, confidential talks with the
international Zionism led on 2 November 1917 to the bal. ur
declaration of sympathy, which favored "the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people . . . ."3 This "secret diplomacy," associated
with the traditional European trade of influence, had to
give place, at the end of the war, to the Peace Conference

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carried out according to liberal ideas of the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. It is within such a transitional ~xternal setting that the Lebanese Republic reached its independence.

A. THE MILITARY OCCUPATION

The configuration of Lebanon's relations has followed, since World War I, the gradual evolution of the international system which reached in the mid twentieth century the basic structures of the actual global and subordinate systems.

1. In September 1918, coordinating with Prince Faysal,4 who was leading the Arab revolt towards Damascus, General Allenby advanced from Egypt along the coast to seize Palestine, thus clearing the way to the Anglo-French "arrangement reached at the conference held at the Foreign Office" on 30 September 1918. In fact, on 7 October, a French division under the

Sykes-Picot secret agreement the Levant (Phoenicia)

Map 7

command of General Gouraud landed in Beirut to ensure the "predominant place in all operations within the blue zone."5 This area became the western zone in the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A.) signed on 22 October; the southern zone remained uunder exclusive British control and the Eastern zone (zone A on the map) was given to Faysal to install an Arab state with Damascus as capital. However, something had changed since this Anglo-French Convention of 1916; the United States had entered the war and Russia was out.

Rivalry between British and French remained equal to itself; only the United States intervention could temper their ambitions. President Wilson opposed a categorical refusal to any territorial annexation and proclaimed that the principal of self government should receive loyal application. Therefore the Peace Conference and the League of Nations entered the international system animated with American ideals.

2.   The Peace Conference - the opening of the Peace Conference in Paris on 18 January 1919 remodeled Europe. That same year it imposed the Peace Treaties on Germany (Versailles, 29 June), on Austria (St.-Germain-en-laye, 19 September), and on Bulgaria (Neuilly, 27 November); the second year, on Hungary (Trianon, 6 June), and finally on Turkey (the Peace Treaty of Sevres, 10 August 1920), which

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called for dismantling the Ottoman Empire. However, thanks to Ataturk's revolution, the treaty of Lausanne, 26 July 1923, replaced the defunct treaty of Sevres. The Lausanne settlement preserved the integrity of Turkish territory, leaving the Arab world to the mercy of France and Britain.

a. The Arab claims were presented to the secretary of the conference in a first memorandum of Prince Faysal on 1 January 1919, developing the aim of the Arab nationalist movements: "To unite the Arabs eventually into one nation," but with different frame of government for the Arab provinces of Syria,6 Iraq, Jezireh, Hejaz, Nejd, and Yemen, because of their momentary economical and social incompatibility. To accept foreign technical advice but "willing to pay for this help in cash; we cannot sacrifice for it any part of the freedom we have just won for ourselves by force of arms." A note dated 29 January followed the memorandum; it excluded from the Arab demand the independent Hejaz and the British dependency of Aden. On 6 February, Prince Faysal, representing his father, submitted orally his demands to the Peace Conference in Paris and came back on a French ship (via Beirut) to Damascus, where he had already established a "Military Arab Government," as a preliminary step toward an ephemeral "United Kingdom of Syria" with the famous slogan, "the independence is to be taken, not to be given."

b. The Lebanese claims officially began when the Administrative Council of Mount-Lebanon took decision No. 80 on 9 December 1918. This decision comprised, as preliminary, a national and judicial pleading to the following points to be submitted to the Peace Conference:

To expand Mount-Lebanon to its natural and historical limits.

To confirm the country's independence in the management of its administrative and judicial matters.

To have an elected parliament enjoying all rights of modern democratic countries.

To ask the assistance of France to obtain the wishes previously announced, to guarantee the independence, and to collaborate in educational and cultural matters.

Therefore a delegation of seven representatives had been dispatched to Paris where the Peace Conference held its meetings and hearings. The president of the delegations, Dr. Ammun, addressed the conference on 13 February 1919 on the subject of the council's decision. He outlined that collaboration with France would not imply renunciation of rights or abdication of independence. Although interdependent with Syria, Lebanon would not accept being an integral part of it; Lebanon would prefer the precarious situation of being isolated to the danger of being forced to join a state with little or no governmental traditions and less developed institutions. A few days later a separate note was forwarded to complement the initial request; it

delineated and justified Lebanon's historical and natural borders.

Rumors concerning the imminent establishment of a United Arab State to include Lebanon were spread by Faysal supporters.7 To put an end to rumors, the Administrative Council, meeting in Baabda, unanimously8 adopted a declaration of independence (Decision No. 561, 20 May 1919):

> To proclaim the political and administrative independence of Lebanon within its natural and historical borders; to consider the land detached by force and spoiliation, Lebanese as before.
>
> To form a democratic government based on freedom, fraternity, equal opportunities, with safeguard of minorities' rights and religious freedom.
>
> The Lebanese government and the assisting French government should agree on the decision concerning economic relations between Lebanon and neighboring states.
>
> To start the study and elaboration of the Constitution.
>
> To present this decision to the General Peace Conference.
>
> To publish this decision in the official journal and other national newspapers to calm Lebanese apprehensions.

Once again Lebanon sought independence from the Peace Conference. The Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Ilyas Hoyek, head of the delegation, pointed out that Lebanon should be treated as an ally and went as far as to claim reparations and indemnities for injustices committed by the Ottomans

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during the war. He pressed for a separate and enlarged Lebanon under French protection.

The patriarch's interventions before the Peace Conference and his lobbying efforts during his stay in France were considered to be a significant counterbalance in favor of Lebanon's independence in its actual borders.

c. The King-Crane Commission. C. R. Crane and Dr. H. C. King were the two members of the American section of the projected International Commission on Mandates in Turkey.9 They arrived 10 June 1919 in Jaffa and reached Beirut on 5 July. In the O.E.T.A. west, they summarized the wishes of the people; these extracts are significant:

> There were a number of empathetic assurances that the great majority of the population including even the Maronites, prefers America to any other; this is said to be based upon America's unselfishness in the war; her generosity before and after the armistice, and the personal relationships established by the large number of Lebanese who have gone to live for shorter or longer periods in the United States and who returned home loyal.

Many inhabitants of this area feel that they

> are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctively higher order of civilization than the people of the interior. It is among these that the idea of a complete political separation of the Lebanese area from the rest of Syria has taken root.

Many of the Christians inclined toward a greater Lebanon under a French mandate, "But there is a considerable party, even among the pro-French, who are opposed to becoming a part of France. This is in fact the official Maronite

position." The King-Crane Commission submitted its report to the American commission of 5 September 1919, recommending:

   (1). A mandatory administration under the League of Nations.

   (2). The unity of Syria; Lebanon is included but with its "own large autonomy."

   (3). One mandatory power for all Syria.

   (4). Emir Faysal to be head of the new United Syrian state.

   (5). "Serious modifications of the extreme Zionist program."

It is important to look at the similarities of the committee's recommendation with the "Damascus Program," decided by the General Syrian Congress on 2 July 1919:

   (1). Absolute independence of Syria, including Cilicia on the north extending as far as Rafah on the south and the Syrian desert on the east, without Protectorate or Mandate.

   (2). Request for democratic representation, noncentralized administration, monarchical government under Prince Faysal, whose "jihad" to liberate this "umma" makes him worthy of confidence.

   (3). Objection to the application of Art. 22 of the League Covenant on Syria.

   (4) and (5). Technical and economical "assistance" from the United States, or, as second choice, from Great Britain.

   (6). Rejection of any French claims or assistance anywhere and in any way on any part of Syria.

   (7). Opposition to a Zionist state and Jewish immigration.

(8). Opposition to independence of Greater Lebanon.

(9). Request of the full independence of Iraq "qutur" without economic barriers between the two "quturs."10

(10). A protest against secret treaties and private agreements (by inference to Sykes-Picot agreement and Balfour declarations; the secret correspondence between Hussein and McMahon was not yet made public).

The report of the King-Crane Commission, which favored the Arab claims, had not the chance to be discussed; it reached the White House on 27 September. On 2 October President Wilson--becoming paralyzed--could not struggle to implement a policy in which he believed. The report would not be published until 1922, in part in the New York Times.11

B. THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE

1. The concept. The League of Nations had made it clear as to how the principle of Mandate should be implemented, as Art. 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations stated:

The tutelage of such people should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The text also differentiated among three types of Mandates: A, B, and C; B and C were for the less and the

least developed countries, while the mandate type A applied
to Lebanon as to:

> Certain communities formerly belonging to the
> Turkish Empire have reached a state of development
> where their existence as independent nations can be
> provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
> administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory
> until such time as they are able to stand alone.
> The wishes of these communities must be a principal
> consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
> The Mandatory shall render to the council an annual
> report in reference to the territory committed to
> its charge.

The League of Nations also had to define the degree
of authority, control, and administration to be exercised by
the entrusted advanced nations. Accordingly, a permanent
commission was constituted to examine the reports and to
"advise the council on all matters relating to the
observance of the mandate." The Council of the League also
had to define the degree of authority, control, and
administration to be exercised by the entrusted nations.
Without the United States, the League of Nations could not
implement its concept; the first draft of the Mandate was
rejected by France and Great Britain. Another instrument
was elaborated to meet the Mandatory's wishes rather than
the country's needs.

2. De jure. On 26 July 1922,12 the requested
instrument confirming the mandate defined its terms in a
text of twenty articles. The Mandatory had the rights and
the obligations:

- to promulgate an organic law, in agreement with local authorities, within three years from the date the mandate became effective (Art. 1).

- to maintain its own troops and to organize a local militia, "Nothing shall preclude" Lebanon from contributing to the maintenance of the coast (Art. 2).

- to be in charge of the "exclusive control of the foreign relations" (Art. 3).

- to guarantee the territorial integrity (Art. 4) and the privilege of foreigners (Art. 5).

- to assure a judicial system compatible with religious imperatives (Art. 6).

- to ensure "complete freedom of conscience" (Art. 8).

- not to restrict the activities of all religious missions (Art. 9 and 10).

- not to interfere in the administration of the councils of management (Art. 9).

- to apply the extradition treaties presently in effect (Art. 7); to ensure equal conditions for commerce, transit, taxes, and concessions to all members of the League (Art. 11).

- to adhere on behalf of Lebanon to agreements sponsored by the League (Art. 12 and 13).

- to regulate archaeology and antiquities (Art. 14).

- to be reimbursed for expenses of "which the country retains the benefit" (Art. 15).

- to have French and Arabic as official languages (Art. 16).

Finally, the role of the Council of the League had emphasized the international character of the Mandate: to control through an annual report, to hear and determine disputes of international character and use its influence to safeguard fulfillment of financial obligations (Art. 17, 18, 19, 20).

The "charter" came into effect on 29 September 1923; far beyond reflecting the Wilsonian spirit of the aforementioned Article 22, several dispositions and omissions favored the Mandatory or its allies. A major omission related to the conclusion of the mandate, combined with laconic recommendations, such as "progressive development" toward independence, shaped in part the Franco-Lebanese relationship throughout the exercise of the Mandate.

c. De facto. When the French troops landed in Beirut in 1918, they were received as liberators; in fact, it was the beginning of a two-year direct administration of "enemy territory." The Lebanese deception was directly proportional to their expectations. Frenchmen of the occupation were different from the French that Lebanese knew through their readings on the renaissance and the French

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revolution. Even when General Gouraud, French High Commissioner, proclaimed the organization of Greater Lebanon, the people were far from satisfied. Indeed, two years later, when an ordinance of a pseudo-constitution was decreed, the Lebanese expressed immense discontent:

> The most frequently repeated reason given for their dissatisfaction is that before the war the Lebanon enjoyed a very large degree of independence, particularly in the matter of local autonomy, while under present conditions under the French Administration and the provisions of the new constitution [sic], the people of the Lebanon enjoy little or no independent action or local autonomy.[13]

The haughty personal style of the High Commissioner was a major factor in modeling the relations between Lebanon and France. In a speech delivered at the opening session of the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon, he addressed his audience with an officer's voice to troops and teacher's words to students:

> I have asked your Governor to submit to you a project which will serve as a first basis for your examination of this question which actually predominates over all others of interest to the state. This he will do in a few days, after you have accomplished the business of your first sesson and appointed the commissions which must prepare your work.

He tried to convince them that they were important and that every question of interest to Lebanon must be forwarded to the representatives to be discussed [sic] and he exposed the spirit of this "Ordinance of 8 March 1922, which never had

the pretention to bind the council to an unchangeable statute."14

The French came into Lebanon with a sincere sentiment to help, but the victory after World War I and the open-ended period of the mandate aroused the sleeping spirit of colonialism. This mentality found in the laconic expressions and vague terms of the Mandate the latitude to extend as far as possible the end terms of their tutorship. For example, the progressive development as independent state could be implemented in different ways and approaches: the most rapid approach is to continue progressing from the phase already reached with big steps. The slowest approach is to start again from the beginning and to progress with small cautious steps. It seems that French authority adopted the second approach with some significant alteration: every few steps forward one big step backward. The two French declarations of policy as of July and August 1927 after a general state of turmoil, made it clear that France would not "renounce its mandate" but was willing to comply with the wishes of the people when "expressed during period of order and peace."15 This stated policy of carrying out the mandate was judiciously recognized by the Lebanese as defined in diplomatic terms to secure the French position within the League of Nations rather than to implement a definite program in Lebanon. In fact, candid

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reports from the American Consul in Beirut always mentioned
Lebanon's urge for autonomy and independence while his
homologue in Paris simply referred to the same country as
"French Levantine possessions."16   This quite different
perspective of the mandate seen from Paris always provoked
in Lebanon a violent press campaign against French policy; a
bilateral treaty of friendship and alliance, finally signed,
was never ratified by the French government; it led to
further problems in November 1943.

In June 1941, the Free French willing to gain
Lebanon's support proclaimed its independence but did not
change greatly its political status.   Bitterness replaced
friendship; a strongly anti-French movement had the support
of Christians as well as Muslims.   This trend existed in
villages as well as in towns.   The Lebanese government
continued moving towards full independence unilaterally,
strong in its constitution, its judicial rights, and British
recognition of independence.   The French procedures to
arrest the president of the republic and high state
officials culminated the anti-French trend.   Their
liberation after eleven days, on 22 November, was a national
triumph.   France, which had prepared well for its entry to
Lebanon in the aftermath of World War I, did not at all
prepare its exit.   Therefore, the struggle for independence
continued, but on the international level within the

framework of the United Nations and amid final tribulations to maturity of the Middle East Subordinate System.

C. THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

On 1 September 1920, Greater Lebanon recovered the historical and natural limits of the mountain. On 8 March 1922, an ordinance of fifty articles, creating and organizing the working of the Representative Council, fell short of defining the state nature of Greater Lebanon. It is the Constitution of 23 May 1926 and four amendments that defined its political assets as the Lebanese Republic and the National Pact that made Lebanon's independence possible.

1. Constitutional Laws

a. *The Constitution established the Lebanese Republic* to be effective on 1 September 1926 (Art. 101); it has a parliamentary and democratic structure that guarantee to the Lebanese basic rights and duties:

- First and most important is the right to freedom: "Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected. No one can be arrested or detained except in accordance with the provisions of the law" (Art. 8).

"Liberty of conscience is absolute" according to Article 9, which also guarantees "to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious interests."

"Education is free" so long as it does not disagree with traditional ethics. Communities have the right to their own schools (Art. 10).

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Freedom of speech, press, meetings, and association are also guaranteed (Art. 13).

-Second, right to equal opportunity to Lebanese citizens; they "are equally admitted to all public functions without any other cause for preference except their merit and competence" (Art. 12).

-Third, right to security of domicile; it can not be violated. "None can enter it except in cases provided by law and according to the form it prescribes" (Art.14).

-Fourth, right to property; it "is under the protection of the law" (Art. 15).

-Fifth, the Lebanese enjoy equal rights, charges, and duties; they "are equal before the law"; according to Article 7, all Lebanese without any distinction "enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subject to public charges and duties."

b. The amendments. The first amendment of 17 October 1927 made the parliamentary regime unicameral and strengthened the authority of the president of the republic (see annex) and established the ministerial solidarity of the cabinet (Art. 69). The second amendment of 8 May 1929 modified Article 49 to raise the mandate of the president of the republic from three to six years, defined the provisions to dissolve the chamber (Art. 55) and made no incompatibility between deputation and ministerial office (Art. 98). It also gave the absolute right to a deputy to question the responsibility of the ministers (Art. 37). The third amendment on 18 March 1943 modified the Constitution to be compatible with the since prevailing principle of universal suffrage.[17]

The fourth amendment of 8 November 1943 modified five articles to free the Constitution from any relation with the Mandate. Reference to France and League of Nations was deleted (Art. 1), deletion of French as second official language (Art. 11) and deletion of reference to Articles 1 and 3 of the Mandate (Art. 95 and 52) and a provision to "Lebanonize" the frame of the Cedar's flag (Art. 5). The Articles 90, 91, 92, 94, and 95 were also abrogated.

This amendment, the most important at political and international dimensions would not have been possible if the Lebanese Muslims and Christians did not reach a common agreement: the National Pact.

2. The National Pact

a. The status quo. After the third amendment, the legislative body was elected on 29 August and 5 September 1943. The new chamber was composed of fifty-five deputies in a proportional representation of thirty seats for Christians to twenty-five seats for Muslims.18 On their first meeting the deputies elected Sabri Hamade (Shi'a) as president of the chamber and 21 September elected Beshara Khury (Maronite) president of the republic; Khury appointed Riad Solh (Sunni) premier. The will of this government to move toward complete independence now that French peril in World War II was removed was at variance with France's unyielding attitude: "they were proving to the whole world

they had no intention of keeping their word."19 However,
the Lebanese government intended "to keep dispute on
constitutional plane and do nothing to precipitate
trouble"20 (see Fourth Amendment).

On 5 November, the French delegate general21 issued
a communique stating that Lebanese government and Parliament
may not validly modify the Constitution, unless made with
French assent.22 The Lebanese government reviewed the
communique and considered that modification of Constitution
was within the rights of the Lebanese legislative authority.
According to the provisions of Article 76 of the
Constitution, the government presented the Parliament a bill
to modify articles made incompatible with absolute and
recognized independence.

b. The French coup d'etat. On 11 November at
four o'clock in the morning after interrupting all means of
communications (except Allied military means), and without
informing the Allies, making extensive use of coup d'etat
techniques, French "security men" and armed forces of
Senegalese under French officers' command proceeded to
arrest the president of the republic, the prime minister,
ministers, and the president of the legislative. Before
sunrise, they were taken to an ancient fort at Rashaya to be
held in separate cells.

On the same day, M. Helleu, French delegate general
in the Levant, issued an ordinance to declare the fourth

amendment null and void (Art. 1), the dissolution of the chamber (Art. 2), the suspension of the Constitution (Art. 3), the executive authority to be held by a "head of state head of government," (Art. 5) appointed by himself. The British, who had recognized Lebanon's independence, disapproved French behavior. The United States in a telegram sent to Algiers on 12 November directed Murphy to "urgently inform" the French Committee of National Liberation to take "prompt steps to restore the duly elected government," otherwise the U.S. government would publicly announce its disapproval and "take such further steps as may appear appropriate." Lebanon stupefication soon turned to indignation and the deeply felt insult highly contributed to exteriorizing people's sincere unanimity and aspirations.

c. The National Pact. Friendly support from Great Britain and America as well as Lebanese emigrants lobbying efforts were rewarded. On 21 November, M. Helleu was called back to Algiers, and the Lebanese officials freed from Rashaya on 22 November returned triumphally to Beirut among the complete support of Christians and Muslims; the status quo of the duly elected national government was restored. President and Premier gave several speeches that reflected sincere agreement on basic issues of capital importance for the Lebanese. This unwritten agreement between the two Presidents Khury and Solh, and all who

militated with them, proved to meet unaminity when made

public through multiple statements; it came to be known as

the National Pact. It reflected the following issues:

> Absolute independence of Lebanon; the Christians will refrain to ask for continual French protection and Muslims will refrain to urge for unity into an Arab State with Damascus.

> Lebanon has an "Arab face"; its language is Arabic. Its relations with the Arab world would not interrupt its links of culture and civilization established with the West.

> Lebanon's vocation requires collaboration with the Arab States; these States which would have recognized its independence and its entity within the actual borders. Lebanon would maintain among all of them fraternal relations without favoritism.[23]

The first famous and long lasting statement concerning

the pact came from the famous Lebanese columnist George

Naccash: "two negations do not constitute a Nation." In

later events during 1958 and more clearly during the 1975-76

Crisis, the pact endured severe injuries, died and

resurrected. Thus, proving to be effective, the National

Pact must always be renewed and renovated (hopefully without

crisis) to deal with issues of the moment in order to

consolidate the people into geniune citizenry as proclaimed

by Premier Solh in 1943: "The hour when confessionalism can

be abrogated would be a blessed and full national awakening

moment in Lebanon's history."[24]

D. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS, 1516-1949

1516-1842

The Emirate of the Lebanon mountain--Libanus Feudal System:
the Maan Emirs (1516-1697), the Shihab Emirs (1697-1842).

1843-1860

The twin Qaymaqamat: Christian and Druze districts each
headed by a deputy-governor.

9 June 1861

A protocol and organic statute restored Lebanon's autonomy
with the representative council of Mount-Lebanon and a
Christian governor.

1915-1918

World War I.

7 October 1918

French troops landed in Beirut.

22 October 1918

Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA).

25 April 1920

St. Remo agreement conferred upon France a "Mandate of Syria
and the Lebanon."

1 September 1920

"State of greater Lebanon" from Nahr al Kabir in the north,
to Palestine in the south, and anti-Lebanon and Bekaa
included in the east, Beirut being the capital.

31 December 1920

Anglo-French agreement on the geographical borders of territories under mandate; the border between Lebanon (French Mandate) and Palestine (British Mandate) is the actual southern international border between Lebanon and Israel.

26 July 1922

The League of Nations endorsed the French Mandate to "Syria and the Lebanon."

29 September 1923

French Mandate on behalf of the League to "Syria and the Lebanon" entered into effect.

1 September 1926

Greater Lebanon became a constitutional "Lebanese Republic."

21 September 1939

French suspended Lebanese Constitution dissolved Chamber of Deputies and established provisional war regime. This "caused no great surprise,"[25] Lebanon had sympathetic feelings toward a France in peril.

26 November 1941

General Catroux read the proclamation of independence to Lebanese people who did not show any sign of popular enthusiasm. Most were disappointed; the Patriarch was "particularly bitter"; the President was not elected but named."[26]

25 December 1941

Resolutions adopted at the Maronite Patriarchate by groups
representing all religious communities and regions:
effective independence and freedom to contract treaties with
foreign power and freedom to enact laws . . . and all
measures taken by the above mentioned government "should be
considered null and void."

27 December 1941

King George VI conveyed his congratulations to the Lebanese
President, and on 31 December, the Lebanese Government was
officially notified of British recognition.

11 November 1943

French "coup d'etat" technique in Lebanon: arrest of
officials and appointment of a new governor.

22 November 1943

The President of the Republic and officials reinstalled into
power.

22 December 1943

Agreement to transfer without delay French "administration
and services of common interests" to Lebanon and Syria.

22 March 1945

League of Arab States Covenant; Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and Trans Jordan are the members.

26 June 1945

Lebanon joined the United Nations.

31 December 1946

Evacuation of the last French military rear party (30 officers and 300 technicians).

23 March 1949

Lebanon armistice with Israel is signed; the armistice demarcation line was established on the international frontier and was made identical with it.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

[1]The British published the English versions of the ten letters in a pamphlet with the following title: Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939) Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sharif of Mecca, July 1915. March 1916, presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Cmd 5957.

[2]Later known as Sykes-Picot agreements; see map no. 7. Discovered during the revolution of October 1917, they were made public one year later. These agreements were supplemented by the first serious talks at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne on 19 April 1917 (Italy's condition to enter the war).

[3]Letter from Lord Balfour, British Secretary of State at the Foreign Office to Lord Lionel W. Rotschild, a British-Jewish personality who supported the Zionist movement. The letter was read in a public meeting at the Opera in London on 2 December 1917.

[4]Prince Faysal, son of Sharif Hussein Al Hashimi, Sharif of Mecca, had led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, this revolt was fomented and supplied with arms by the British authorities.

[5]Western zone was in reference to the west of Sykes-Picot line, by opposition to eastern zone at the east side of that line.

[6]In the Arab claims about Syria, Lebanon is always included as in McMahon letter dated 26 October 1915. Answer to the second letter of Hussein ". . . portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded." (Lebanon is situated west of Damascus-Hama districts.)

[7]See above, Arab Claims: arrival of Faysal to Beirut on French ship.

[8]The name of Mahmud Junblat is on the Decision 561, but not his signature .... The signatories are: Mahmud Muhsen Haji, Yussof Breidi, Nicolas Ghosn, Elias Shoueri,

Muhamad Sabra Aawar, Fuad Abdel Malak, Daoud Ammoun, Suleiman Kenaan, Khalil Akl, Saadallah Hoyek and the president of the Council Habib (Pasha) al Saad.

9President Wilson did not like the Sykes-Picot agreement and proposed an international commission to make a survey; only the American section went, although the Allies had agreed.

10The word "qutur" used with the name of a state means that the entity so called belongs to the Umma which is one and unique. I would personally make the parallel with the British "shire," as in Yorkshire.

11A little delay is due to American intervention; the United States intervention aimed to preserve the rights of the American Univeristy of Beirut (A.U.B.). On 4 April 1924, a Franco-American Convention strengthened the status of the A.U.B.

12Italy had pretentions to undertake the exercise of the mandate because of its traditional policy in the country. Therefore, the Council of the League passed a resolution that the mandate would enter into effect when France and Italy notified the Council that an agreement had been reached; notification happened fourteen months later.

13"But a great wave of secret disappointment has swept over the people. Their ambition, in principle, has been realized in the creation of an independent Greater Lebanon, but they are chagrined at the manner in which it has been conceived and to be executed by their protectors. It is their undisguised feeling that they have lost the real independence they had formerly enjoyed when they administered their country under their own Legislative Assembly composed of Lebanese, when all their governing officials were Lebanese." Department of State, letter to the Hon. Secretary of State from the American Consulate General, 27 April 1922, cited in Brown, The Political History of Lebanon (Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1976), p. 21.

14Ibid., pp. 37-43.

15Ibid., pp. 64-66.

16To State Department from U.S. Consulate, Paris, France, 28 May 1926, Brown, The Political History of Lebanon, p. 58.

[17]Amendment by decree from the French delegate; this amendment has been voted on 21 January 1947 and as such bears that date in the official Arabic text used for the translation of the constitution in the annex.

[18]The Christians favored a 32:22 ratio prescribed by Tabet (Christian emigrants were re-integrating Lebanon); for more, see telegram to Secretary of State from Consulate General, Beirut, 16 July 1943 (Sections 1 and 2) and telegram received in Beirut 21 July (Sections 1 and 2), and telegram received in Beirut 2 August (Sections 1, 2, and 3). The 6:5 ratio is still in effect (Brown).

[19]Telegram to Secretary of State from Consul General, Beirut, 9 November 1943 (Brown).

[20]On 8 June 1941, General Catroux, representing Free France, declared: "I come to put an end to the mandatory regime . . . you will be henceforth sovereign and independent." In a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the League, General de Gaulle assured that General Catroux, representing this time the French National Committee (London, 1941), "proclaimed on Nov. 26, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon." However, it does not "affect the legal situation created by the mandate . . . ."

[21]Replaced the denomination of high commissioner used before the arrival of the Allies to Lebanon and declaration of independence.

[22]In fact, the legal statute of the Mandate could not be affected, because the League of Nations only has the right to introduce any modification to the Mandate (Art. 18). Transitory provisions remained effective. Thus, the amendment was constitutionally valid and conformed to the spirit of the League.

[23]Lebanese Documents and Administration Magazine (L.D.A.M.) (Arabic), National Archives, Year 3, No. 4, pp. 4-6.

[24]Ibid., p. 11.

[25]Letter to Honorable Secretary of State from American Consulate General, Beirut, Syria, 9 September 1939.

[26]Telegram to Secretary of State, Washington, from Consul General, Beirut, 29 November 1941.

[27]Enclosure no. 2 to dispatch no. 270 dated 30 January 1942 from the American Consul General, Beirut, Lebanon.

PART II

STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

CHAPTER IV

FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The Crisis of 1958 and the Crises of 1975-76 were the overall products of the environmental changes in the Middle East Subordinate System. These changes encompass the total web of economic, diplomatic, and military aspects of the international and regional systems as well as the whole pattern of political, social, cultural, psychological, and ethical values of the internal structures of Lebanon. To study this complex interrelation a conceptual framework has been drawn from the "Research design" developed by Brecher, Steinberg and Stein in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution" of 1 March 1969. It is based on the concept of system which is valid in foreign policy as well as in domestic politics. The crises are studied according to an outline following the general sequences for pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods of the environmental change.

The Conceptual Framework[1]

Inputs:

Operational Environment & Environmental Change

> External Setting
>
>> o Global System
>>
>> o Subordinate System
>>
>> o Subordinate Others
>
> Internal Setting
>
>> o Political Structure
>>
>> o Demographical Structure
>>
>> o Strategic Others

Psychological Environment & Perception of Threat

> o Attitudinal Prism
>
> o Elite Images

Coping Process

Information, consultations, possible courses of action and alternatives.

Decision

The choice of a policy in an issue area.

Output

Implementation of policy and feedback: impact on the environment. Does it produce a threat increase or a threat decrease?

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The operational environment defines the setting in which decision-makers are called to undertake actions concerning pertinent matters. It engulfs the external and internal settings. Lebanon's external setting, having changed in the interval of two decades, is not the same for each crisis. Consequently, it will be examined at the beginning of the pre-crisis period of each case study.

The internal setting of Lebanon remained similar to itself in some issue areas. The political, economical, and cultural variables of the internal setting had no structural variations. The population pattern, faithful to its historical and geographical background remained strongly attached to deep rooted values.

The first input in the internal setting is the political structure. Since 1926, Lebanon has been a constitutional republic (see constitution in Annex A). Four amendments made this Constitution more democratic and more representative, strengthened the authority of the President of the Republic and finally freed it from any allusion to the mandate system in November 1943. Since that time Lebanon's political structure has not changed.

A. The Political Structures

1. The Parliament: Lebanon has a unicameral parliamentary structure; the Chamber of Deputies, composed of elected members, is the legislative authority (Art 16).

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The deputies are partitioned, for "equitable representation" according to religious communities or ethnic groups (see table 1), into different electoral districts. According to the provisions of the electoral law, the deputies are elected by all the common roll of the electoral district without confessional discrimination among the voters. That is, all the persons constituting the electoral body of a district (Muslims and Christians) may vote to elect the representatives of that district among the candidates. Once elected, each Deputy will represent the nation. "No imperative mandate may be given to him by his electors" (Art 27). The Deputy enjoys also a double parliamentary immunity; he can not be prosecuted during his mandate for his opinions (Art 39) and, while the session is in progress, for infractions to penal law except in a case of flagrante delicto (Art 40). The Chamber holds public debates and may also convene in secret committee (Art 35). The Chamber has the initiative and responsibility to make its own internal regulations (Art 43). At the first meeting the Chamber elects its President (Speaker) (Art 44). Since the status quo of the independence days the speaker is Muslim Shi'a; he is the number two man of the Republic. He is elected annually as head of the unicameral legislative assembly, which firstly enjoys an absolute autonomy in legislation matters. "Initiative for legislation belongs to the

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Table 1. Evolution of the Representative Body

Years		Communities*							Ratios	%	Notes
		M	GO	GC	C	S	Sh	D			
1845-60		2	2	2	-	3	1	2			Twin Qaymaqamat**
1861-64		2	2	2	-	2	2	2			Mutasarrifat of
1864-1915		4	2	1	-	1	1	3	7:5		Mount-Lebanon***
1915-20		W O R L D W A R I									
1920-22		6	3	1	1	4	2	1	10:7	59	
1922-25		10	4	1	1	6	6	2	8:7	53	
1925-26		10	4	2	1	6	5	2	17:13	56.6	
1926-29	1st	15	6	3	2	9	8	3	13:10	56.5	
1929-31	2d	15	6	3	1	9	8	3	5:4	55.6	Mandate
1932-34		C O N S T I T U T I O N S U S P E N D E D									
1934-37	3d	7	4	2	1	5	4	2	14:11	56	
1937-39	4th	20	7	4	4	13	11	4	35:28		
1939-43		C O N S T I T U T I O N S U S P E N D E D									
1943-47	5th	18	6	3	3	11	10	4	6:5	55	
1947-51	6th	18	6	3	3	11	10	4	6:5		
1951-53	7th	23	8	5	6	16	14	5	6:5		
1953-57	8th	13	5	3	3	9	8	3	6:5		
1957-60	9th	20	7	4	5	14	12	4	6:5		
1960-present	10th	30	11	6	7	20	19	6	6:5		ever since

*M Maronite, GO Greek Orthodox, GC Greek Catholic, C Christian, S Sunni, Sh Shi'a, D Druze
**Two separate bodies of representatives.
***The first representation was based on parity; after 1864, proportional.

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President of the Republic and the Chamber of Deputies" (Art 18). "In order that a law may be promulgated, it must have been approved by the Chamber (Art 19). The provisions of articles 81 to 89 relative to finance affairs give the parliament the preeminent legislative role. Secondly, the Chamber is the only authority to elect the President of the Republic, largely contributing, to political renovation. By virtue of articles 76 to 79, the Chamber has the unique privilege to amend the Constitution. Thirdly, the parliament checks and balances the executive (Art 37) and enjoys a judicial control over the Ministers (Art 71 and 72). In fact the parliament does not meet the expectation of the Constitution for several reasons:

- the weak democratic representativity; the voter participation varies around a general mean of 50-56 percent;[2] it shows that about the half the adult population registered on the electoral rolls do not care to vote.

- the slow growth of party representation, therefore the parliament is under predominant control of parliamentary groups coalition with regional or confessional character (compare tables 2 and 3).

- confessional representation corrected in part weakened representation and provides every confession its share, thus shifting the competition among communities to regional rivalry between members of the same community.[3] It

Table 2. Party Representation

Party and leader	Legislature						
	1951	1953	1957	1960	1964	1968	1972
Const. Union/Khury	5	3	3	5	5	3	3
Phalanges/Gemayel, P.	3	1	2	6	4	9	7
Liberal Nat. Party/Chamoun	-	-	-	5	7	8	11
Lebanese Nat. Bloc/Eddi	3	3	5	4	3	6	3
Najjada/Hakim	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Popular Socialist/Saadi	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Prog. Socialist/P. Junblat	2	1	2	5	6	5	5
Tashnaq (Lib. Armenian)	2	1	2	4	4	4	4
TOTAL	15	9	15	30	29	36	33
Seats	77	44	66	99	99	99	99
Percentages	19%	20%	23%	31%	29%	37%	34%

Table 3. Communitarian Representation

Districts	Communities*							
	M	GO	GC	C	S	Sh	D	TOTAL
Beirut	1	2	1	6	5	1	-	16
Beka	2	2	2	-	3	5	1	15
Mt. Lebanon	17	2	1	1	2	2	5	30
Northern Lebanon	8	4	-	-	8	-	-	20
Southern Lebanon	2	1	2	-	2	11	-	18
TOTAL	30	11	6	7	20	19	6	99

*M Maronite, GO Greek Orthodox, GC Greek Catholic,
 C Christian, S Sunni, Sh Shi'a, D Druze

also encouraged the potential candidate to care about his regional electors even if they were not from his own confessional community.

2. The Executive. Article 17 of the Constitution stipulates that the "executive power is entrusted to the President of the Republic who exercises it with the assistance of Ministers . . . ." He also "appoints and dismisses the Ministers among whom he designates a Premier . . ." (Art 53), his act in this exceptional case does not need a countersign (Art 54), therefore the executive is represented in its managerial, constitutional, and political dimensions.

- The Ministers assist individually the President of the Republic; each of his acts "must be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned . . ." (Art 54); therefore the Minister is responsible for the acts of the President within his Department as specified in Article 64 "Ministers assume the higher management of all the State services pertaining to their respective departments."

- The Ministers acting as a collegial body assist the President in important decisions according to provisions of Article 58 concerning promulgation of laws or execution of draft budget (Art 86). Concurring opinion of Ministers Council is also requested by the President when using constitutional authority to dissolve the Chamber (Art 55).

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- The Prime Minister constitutionally is a "primus inter pares,"[4] a Premier among equals nominated with them, by the same authority and at the same time (Art 53). Therefore the Prime Minister's authority is based on traditional political matters rather than on constitutional bases; his role and prestige are in high correlation with the attitude of the President of the Republic and its impact on the Muslim-Sunni Community to whom the Prime Minister belongs. In fact, the Prime Minister shares with the President the responsibility, his participation in decisions is made clear by countersigning all acts of the Head of State. His refusal to do so, and even his resignation, are decisions, although negative, that would mean clear and formal refusal (or impossibleness) to share responsibility over the issues of the moment.

B. Demographic Structure

1. The qualitative approach of the confessional ratios in Lebanon had always been a popular and controversial issue in time of crisis, when a census is simply impossible or unimaginable. This issue constituted no or little disagreement in peaceful times, while some unofficial statistics refuted the prevailing opinion[5] of Muslim majority in Lebanon's resident population.

Economists and private research institutes conducted research and studies on Lebanese demography. They combined

the growth rate which favored the Muslim community with infant mortality and longevity which favored by far the Christian community.6 Another factor is worth considering. Since World War II, the Shi'a, and to a lesser extent, the Sunni started to immigrate especially to Africa, where they prospered and settled; feeling at home, in any Muslim or Arab country, is another remarkable trait of Islam! However, the quantitative aspect of each community should be the last and least important aspect in the assessment of Lebanon's demographic structure (see tables 4 and 5).

The qualitative and social dimension of the Lebanese mosaic is much more worthy to be examined. The Druze community shares their localities and villages with the Christians, especially the Maronites: Aley, Baruk, Falugha, Hammana, Hasbaya, Mukhtara and Rashaya, to cite a few, while they do not share one single village with others. The Christians are neighbors to the Shi'a in the south and the Beka (see table 3). The Greek-Catholics are in Saida with the Muslim-Sunnis; the Christian inhabitants of northern Lebanon also live with the Sunni. It is very rare, almost impossible, to find a single village shared between Sunni, Shi'a or Druzes. Therefore, the contribution of the Christian communities to the mosaic pattern is the range of distribution and the cement which maintain Lebanon's

Table 4.   LEBANON - ESTIMATES ON THE REGISTERED POPULATION

1932 - 1980

Year	Population	Origin of Estimates
1932	793,426	Official Census
1944	1,064,186	Mira Census*
1945	1,146,793	**
1953	1,416,570	Official estimate
1956	1,445,000	Doxiadis estimate
1959	1,626,000	IRFED estimate
1965	1,907,000	IRFED estimate
1970	2,136,000	IRFED estimate
1975	2,393,000	IRFED estimate
1980	2,743,000	IRFED estimate

*Adjusted by Sir Alexander Gibbs and partners
**Ministry of National Economy, 1st quarter 1946.

Table 5.   PERCENT OF LEBANESE RESIDENT POPULATION
BY CONFESSION

Religious Communities	1932	1944	1956	1965
Maronite	28.73	29.10	29.71	29.80
Greek Orthodox	9.74	9.76	10.42	11.37
Greek Catholic	5.88	5.72	6.46	6.88
Other Christian	5.69	8.27	7.89	6.69
TOTAL CHRISTIANS	50.03	52.03	54.48	54.74
Sunni	22.45	20.91	20.22	20.47
Shi'a	19.53	18.58	17.70	19.59
Druze	6.73	6.60	6.25	5.56
TOTAL MOSLEMS	48.71	46.09	44.17	44.67
Others (Alawi, Bahai, Jews)	1.26	1.06	1.36	0.59

Source: 1932 Census report, official government estimates
for 1944, 1956 and 1965 in R. Mallat, Fiscal Policy for
Social Justice and Economic Development in Lebanon, p. 39.

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individuality: a country where religious communities enjoy judicial and legal statute.

2. Christian and Israelite Communities: the law of 2 April 1951 defined the competencies of confessional *authorities for the Christian and Israelite Communities as* well as the execution of their judgements. It also regulated conflictual matters among themselves or between them and civil jurisdiction. The law namely listed: the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic-Melkite, Armenian Gregorian-Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, As-syrian Chaldean Nestorian, Chaldean, Latin, Evangelic and Israelite Communities. The authority of each community embraced the personal status in its largest sense (Art 2 and 6); therefore their competency reached all aspects of the social life and transformed these communities into political powers. Recent law, spurred by women's movements animated by Western ethics, entered into effect on 3 June 1959. Its title "Succession Law for Non-Muslims" is more than significant.

3. Muslim Communities. The legislative degree of January 1955, amended on 5 March 1967 became the Organic law which governed Sunni Community:

> "Sunni Muslims are independent, fully
> independent in their religious matters and their
> Wakfs; they exercise themselves the authority
> to elaborate the regular laws and to assume
> the administration in conformity to the Noble

Shari'a and to the derived rules and regulations, through the body of their representatives chosen among the persons known for their competence and the authority of their opinions and designated in the following articles" (Art 1).

The eighty-five remaining articles defined representation and organized the Sunni Community according to the principles of Election and Shura, the "Mufti of the Lebanese Republic" being the Chief of the Community.

The Shi'a had their law on 19 December 1967 titled "Organization of the Matters of the Muslim Shi'a Community in Lebanon."

"The Muslim Shi'a community is independent in its religious matters, its Wakfs and its institutions; it has representatives among its sons who talk and act on behalf of them, according to the rules of the noble Shari'a and to the Fikh of the Jafarite School, within the limits of Fetwas emanating from the Community's Supreme Authority in the world" (Art 1).[7]

Since then, the Shi'a Community has had a collegial authority ʾ ʾn a general assembly, an executive commission, and a judicial (Shari'a) commission.

The Druze Community had two laws promulgated on 13 July 1962; one is related to the election of two "Sheikh-Akl of the Druze Community"8 and the other to the "constitution of the mazhabi confessional council of the Druze Community," thus Druzes enjoyed formal independence, dual Presidency, democratic election of the Counsel who retained collegial authority.

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C. Strategic Others. The other important structures within
the internal setting are the geographic, the economic, and
the cultural structures.

1. The geographic structure of the Eastern shores of
the Mediterranean Sea had been perceived throughout history
through two distinct
strategic screens. The
Byzantine, the Roman, the
Crusaders, the Ottomans,
the French and British
had perceived the com-
partment of terrain par-
allel to the sea shore as
distinct from the heart-
land. On the contrary,
the Arabs coming from the

Map 8

Arabian Peninsula perceived five compartments along the
shore without Eastern boundaries. This is in fact, the
original and effective example by the Islam of what will be
described later, by the modern strategist as the concept of
heartland applied to Europe (see Maps 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8).
In both concepts, Lebanon had the privileged position to be
in the center and in the common portion of compartments I
and C. Lebanon is only eighty miles from Turkey's southern
border, it is limitrophe to Syria and Israel.

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
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

The neighboring capitals are only within one hundred and fifty miles distance from Beirut, the Lebanese commercial and governmental center. Beirut's seaports and airports are the entry ways to the Mideast. Key to the topography is the Baruk summit which was selected as best site for early warning installations in the sixties. Lebanon's 10,452 square kilometers have the highest density of roadnet in the Mideast, four airports and large protected bays. In Junyah Bay, high tonnage ships used to wait safely while being transloaded, thus maintaining commercial links with the west while Beirut's port was closed, largely contributing to the survival of traditional economic structures.

2. Economic Structure. The pattern of Lebanon's National income was estimated by Badre's Economic Research Institute in Beirut for the period of 1950-58. However questionable, Badre's estimate was "refined with time" and was normally used to update national economic data.9 In summary, Lebanon's economy "fared fairly well at 6.8 percent average compound growth rate" during the period of 1950-74. The per capita real income rose at a yearly average of 4.3 per cent despite the "definite signs of stagnation" showed during the last relatively peaceful decade especially in the tertiary sectorial activity.10

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Thus, Lebanon's economic structure remained almost unchanged throughout the studied period of 1950-77; a small increase of the tertiary activity is noticed on the account of agriculture.

a. Agriculture. Lebanon has four distinct agricultural landmarks, the narrow coastal plain (Sahel), the mountain within springs and brooks altitude (Jabal) or beyond the tree line (Jurd) and the Bekaa high plateau (Sahl) which is at an altitude of 2,850 feet.

Climatically, Lebanon is situated in the temperate zone and enjoys four well-differentiated seasons. In general, the climate is typically Mediterranean on the littoral. It is hot and humid in summertime, temperate in other seasons with a lot of sunny days, thereby encouraging the construction of greenhouses with little or no artificial heating. Vegetables and Mediterranean fruits are commonly cultivated.

The mountain mild climate with dry and cool winds in spring and summer time becomes cold in autumn. In winter, heavy rainfalls are the main assets for irrigation of apple, peach, pear, apricot and citrus trees. The "Jurd," normally covered with snow for four months, is not intensively nor fully exploited.

The Bekaa stretches sixty-six miles from north to south and extends to seven miles wide on the north. It has a mountain cold winter with little snow and a dry climate in

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summer. "It is the richest and most promising plain in Lebanon."11   Grains and vegetables are the principal products; veniculture prospers.

In general, land productivity has been improved by terracing the mountain slopes and by irrigation. Only 18 percent of Lebanese manpower is involved in agriculture; intensive agricultural methods increased the agricultural income by almost 220 percent since 1950; the 206 million grew to 654 million Lebanese pounds in 1974.[12]

b.   Industrial activity in Lebanon is a post World War II experience. Although relatively young, the food and beverage, the textile and its derivatives, the plastic and fiberglass, and the furniture industries alone account for 59 percent of the total number of enterprises. Bottled water industry flourished in the past decade and was destined to supply the Near East. Heavy mineral industries such as iron and aluminum as well as cement industry were built in view of the Middle East market.

Although recent, the growth of Lebanon's industry was tangible.   In 1955, there were 1,861 concerns undertaking industrial activities totaling L.P. 399.5 million with L.P. 862.5 million invested and employing 61,761 workers. By 1970, the industrial activities such as extraction, transformation, processing manufacturing and all other industrial sectors employed 95,535 employees.13   Thus

maintaining its share of the net national product while trade and services slightly increased.

Trade, transit and tourism represented the highest share of the NNP. Internal and triangular trade are based on imports mainly from western countries (72%), while the Arab countries are the best clients of Lebanon's export (52.5%).[14]

Since 1975 Lebanon has experienced only one relatively peaceful year, namely 1977. During all that time the public finances faced enormous economical difficulties: "collecting almost none of its direct taxation levies, half of its customs duties and a portion of its autonomous public domain revenues, the State was still subsidizing wheat, fuel, beets and tobacco . . ."; in 1977, it earmarked "enough funds for several wage raises for its own employees . . . ."[15]

Surprisingly, the Lebanese pound remained the good economic sign; it is not only the result of the Central Bank's holdings in gold which value in the free market came up to about L.P. 15 billion, added to L.P. 7 billion worth of hard currencies. It totaled up to L.P. 22 billion of monetary cover against 3.4 billion of Lebanese pounds in circulation and the equivalent of L.P. 23 billion of all type of currency available at the Lebanese market. Thus, Lebanon's exchange system constitutes "a defacto convertibility"[16] and no specific parity has been decided

upon. The floating exchange rates had always experienced limited or no official intervention.

Therefore, Lebanon's "laissez-faire" economy type seemed to be suitable to local and international oligarchy who believed that this would "establish Lebanon's supremacy over the Middle East in trade, tourism and finance."17

Tourism had been an economical asset of income to the country; its revenues quadrupled in the last decade ending in 1974 with a boosting tourism industry--however, since 1975 tourism dropped drastically because of the general state of insecurity.

3. The cultural structure has two basic components, the government school system and the private school system.

a. The government school system is designed to provide basic education, free of charge to all Lebanese without any distinction whatever.

The percentage of governmental schools in Beirut and Mount Lebanon are very weak when compared to the total number of the resident population.18 In fact the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon (and Beirut) are relying on private institutions, paying high tuitions in order to get the best education they can afford for their children, and bearing privations, because education is believed to be an investment.

The private schools receiving children without charge are mainly run by religious institutions that also possess expensive tuitional schools. Another kind of gratis school is under the management of local religious communities who collect the necessary funds from the members of their community. Such donations are not tax deductible. Therefore the parents who have children in the tuitional schools participate directly (donations) or indirectly (high tuitions) to support the private free school system. They also support the governmental school system by paying their indirect and income taxes.

After each level of education (elementary, intermediate or secondary) students may choose to follow a technical instruction. In this field the students have the choice between the governmental technical schools and the private technical schools. The graduates of the higher technical levels are the backbone of Lebanese manpower.

Universities in Lebanon are as diversified as the schools. The Lebanese University (U.L.) is the largest in the country. It has a decentralized faculty system which covers the entire territory. For the academic year of 1980-81 it had 33,937 Lebanese students registered, 18,368 men and 15,569 women.[19] Eleven other universities have the responsibility for college education in Lebanon. The most historic are the American University of Beirut (A.U.B.) and St. Joseph University (U.S.J.). The A.U.B. is the largest

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American university outside of the continental United States; it is the only university that has a real campus life. It had 6,616 students; almost half were Arabs and foreigners. Only 2,500 were Lebanese.

The U.S.J., which distinguishes itself with its law school, had 5,681 students registered, almost equally divided between men (2,941) and women (2,740).20 Therefore, Lebanon enjoys a complete educational structure and has the highest share of educational assets among the Arab world. Lebanon is also the only Arab country where men and women share equally college education.

In conclusion of the strategic structures of Lebanon, Dr. Shakhashiri's focus on the "A.U.B.-Lebanon connection" in the Middle East is the most significant example:

> o Historically, both Lebanon and the A.U.B. have amply demonstrated that they have authentic missions that are realizable within their geographical boundaries and beyond, only if their respective freedoms are guarded and protected.

> o It has taken the U.S. a long time to recognize that, in its pursuit of world peace, it has a high stake in insuring the safety of this singular connection in the Middle East, which has been repeatedly targeted for destruction by a plethora of anti-Western forces in the region. In short, it is high time that the West, and especially the U.S., realizes fully that the freedom of this A.U.B.-Lebanon connection should become the cornerstone of international strategy for peace--or else, the whole Moslem world would lose its only model of freedom that it has in "residence," and the West would lose its pivotal leverage in world diplomacy and undermine its will to resist compromise of conscience.

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D. Communication and Information

Lebanon's informational assets are the natural links between its people and especially its decision-makers with the operational environment. Lebanon is the only country of the Arab world which enjoys freedom of the press. It is guaranteed by the constitution as well as the liberty of speech and expression. Therefore Lebanon has more than one hundred newspapers that reflect local, regional and international tendencies. From that perspective Lebanese journalism is highly competitive.

Privately owned, the media must remain responsive to the readers in order to augment their sales. Sponsored, the Lebanese newspaper must reflect the ideas, views and tendencies of its sponsors from Arab countries where newspapers are owned by the government. Consequently, Beirut becomes by far the most important center for news agencies and the most popular place for foreign correspondents covering the Middle East area. The Lebanese press is not only written in Arabic for the Arab world but English, French and Armenian magazines and daily papers are well published and widely distributed. The foreign press arrives daily by Air Mail to Lebanon and is widely quoted in local issues.

The information is also channeled through radio news. The proximity of Lebanon to the neighboring capitals

and their Arabic language used make it easy to listen often

to commentators from Syria, Egypt, and Israel and any other

Arab country. On the other hand, the knowledge of foreign

languages make it also easy to listen to different versions

of the news on western stations, such as the B.B.C., the

Voice of America and Radio Montecarlo, even when the news is

not in Arabic.

The last but not least means of information are the

communication assets. Lebanon is linked to the outside

world by three submarine cables to France, Cyprus and Egypt;

by microwave radio and cable to Syria. It has an automatic

international switching center dealing with locally

originated calls or with external traffic.[21]

Long distance facilities are provided through three

coaxial cables going from Beirut to the North, South and

East. If the telecommunication system was seriously

affected by the events of Lebanon it has been rapidly and

effectively restored. It has one of the highest priorities

in the country for its vital importance to restore Lebanon's

role as a business and banking center in the Middle East.

In fact, businessmen are an important link in the

informational system. In permanent contact with the

internal and external setting they are aware of the smallest

environmental change. Through personal contacts with

officials the "information" reaches rapidly the decisional

authority.

The environmental change perceived through an attitudinal prism by the decision authority may be identified as a possible threat. Additional information is needed to cope with it; at this phase, national leadership, comprising political and military decision-makers, intensifies consultations.

Foreign affairs and security officials respectively establish contacts at the diplomatic level and with the national elites which encompass "any group whose attitude, beliefs, or real or potential action, significantly influence national perceptions or decision."22 During that phase, the military decision-making process is also functioning on an assumption basis, that is for planning purposes, identifying the possible courses of action according to the various modes of intervention decided by the high national decision-maker authority who determines the strategic decisions to be implemented in order to end the crisis or at least decrease the threat. The most probable decision strategies are selected from "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-makers" by O. R. Holsti and A. L. George:

   a. "satisficing" strategy as opposed to "optimizing" strategy

   b. "incrementalism" strategy

   c. deciding what to do on the basis of "consensus politics"

      d.   avoidance of value trade-offs

      e.   historical models to adapt for present situations

      f.   reliance on general principles as a guide to action

      g.   reliance on "operationa' code" beliefs

They formed the pattern of al rnatives available to Lebanon, the non-military republi' The national leadership decision has a positive, null or ı · ıtive direct influence on the environment which evolve, in general, into three periods. The pre-Crisis period starts when the decision-maker perceives an event as a threat. A sharp increase of the threat introduces the crisis period which remains until the decision-makers perceive an adequate decrease in threat. The post-crisis period comes to an end with the end of stress or the end of hostilities.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES

[1]Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, "Research Design," _Journal of Conflict Resolution_, 1 March 1969.

[2]M. Hudson, _The Precarious Republic_ (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 222-23.

[3]The Shuf has been one exception; Chamoun (Maronite) and Junblat (Druze) have been incontestable leaders of their respective communities, therefore rivalry continued on regional basis, both leaders have Christian and Druze supporters.

[4]Ch. Rizk, _Regime Politique Libanais_ (Paris: LGDJ, 1966), p. 137.

[5]Fahim Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_ (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 7-9. Muslim majority in Lebanon is 51 percent, in "Mideast Turmoil," _National Geographic Magazine_, September 1980.

[6]Raymond A. Mallat, _Fiscal Policy for Social Justice and Economic Development in Lebanon_ (Beirut: Aleph, 1980), pp. 31-44.

[7]Shar's (Islamic Jurisdiction) Fikh (Jurisprudence).

[8]Traditional rivalry between the two socio-political footings of the Druze community (Junblati/Yazbaki) which replaced (Qaysi/Yamani).

[9]Mallat, _Fiscal Policy for Social Justice and Economic Development in Lebanon_, pp. 71-73.

[10]Ibid., p. 78.

[11]Ibid., p. 97.

[12]Ibid., p. 100.

[13]Ibid., p. 102.

[14]Ibid., p. 109.

[15]Ibid., pp. 124-25.

[16]Ibid., p. 125.

[17]Ibid., p. 126.

[18]Pedagogic statistics year 1980-81, Pedagogic Center for Research and Development (government agency) (Arabic).

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]G. Smatt, "Rapport concernant le developpement du reseau telephonique au Liban," April 1973, and an update by R. Shami, Director General, on 3 January 1983 in a personal interview with the author.

[22]McLaurin, "Technical Report," 1975, p. 11.

CHAPTER V

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS OF 1958 - LEBANESE DIMENSION

Global and Subordinate Systems

The global system and operational environment were
in a balance of power defined as loose bipolarity (see
figure 1). The United States' tight relations with Western
Europe, Japan and Latin America loosened because of internal
dissatisfaction and conflicting interests related mainly to
previous zones of predominant influence or privileged
position, such as the Anglo-French interests in Egypt. On
29 October 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai and on the next

Figure 1

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day France and England occupied Port Said. The United States opposed the action of the tripartite alliance and assumed, within the United Nations, the leadership role to bring the aggressors to a cease-fire and immediate withdrawal of troops. In doing so, the United States leadership, despite the fact of not being consulted, would not endorse such action, by principle or by weighted calculations; the active opposition against the invasion was firstly motivated by a strong need to positively dissociate itself from the action of its Allies and secondly to prevent Russia the "opportunity to pose as the sole defender of the Arabs."1 The American feat, through the United Nations, to call for a cessation of fighting and for a withdrawal of forces transformed Egypt's military defeat into a magnificent political victory which sharply increased Nasser's growing prestige in the Middle East.

The Middle East Subordinate System as of 1958 (see figure 2) had an incomplete outer ring, as viewed with respect to Lebanon's stability issues; only Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were the pro-Western independent actors. The peripheral ring consisted of friendly members of the Arab League. On the core ring, were Lebanon, the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), and Israel. The U.A.R., formed in February 1958, was, at the beginning of the pre-crisis period, two distinct but closely related states: Syria and Egypt.

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MIDDLE EAST SUBORDINATE SYSTEM AS FOR 1958

Figure 2

Syria's quest for identity and stable leadership was far from being realized. The basic choices offered to Syria during previous years were situated between Arab unity or total autonomy. They became, in 1956, more complex when combined with Western or Communist options. To that time, Syria never did enjoy political and economical stability, thus laying the roots to Lebanon's decision to break down the common monetary system in 1950 after an astonishing series of coups d'etat, three in the single year of 1949. Syrian anarchy continued in a succession of military coups, constitutional changes, and referendums. The coming into power of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Ba'th) in

1955 oriented Syria towards fluid Soviet rapprochement, established severe autarky (hindering Lebanese commercial activities), and spurred Nasser's Egypt into a territorial union, adopting, as a matter of fact, the National Objectives of Egypt.

Egypt suffered a period of political instability following the Egyptian-Israeli war of 1948; this milieu was adequate for the "Wafd" party revival, which supported the coup d'etat of July 1952. The coup brought to power the "Free Officers," while King Faruk was deported. The Revolutionary Committee resumed interrupted talks with the British and reached formal agreement on complete British troop evacuation within a period of twenty months. On 18 June 1955, Britain ended its seventy-four year occupation of the Suez Canal. Success of these negotiations strengthened Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, Premier of a newly organized government. He judiciously managed, constitutionally and politically, to be the uncontestable leader of Egypt and pan-Arabism. Internally, he banned all political opposition, especially former allied revolutionary groups; he suppressed every personal, ideological, or economical threat, real or potential. Nasser adopted a hostile attitude towards U.S. policy in the Middle East as a reaction to the 1955 Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, U.S. commitment to Israel, and U.S. assistance to Arab kingdoms. Nasser's objectives were to achieve Arab

solidarity and to establish himself as sole coordinator of Arab foreign policy, sacrificing to these ends the very national interests of Egypt. Encouraged by his extraterritorial personal popularity, Nasser accepted a merge with Syria in February 1958 to constitute the United Arab Republic, thus changing his policy from simple solidarity to territorial union. This particular unification suffered a major geographical shortfall: the route of communication by land between Cairo and Damascus passed by Tel-Aviv.

Israel, the third and last actor on the core ring, enjoyed in its relations with Lebanon the status quo of 1949. Since that time, minor incidents at the Lebano-Israeli borders were settled at periodical meetings of the mixed armistice commission. Their mutual international relations reflected a statutory hostile image.

Pre-Crisis Period, October 1956 - May 1958

First Environmental Change

In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Sinai and the Anglo-French attack on Port Said, Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries interrupted diplomatic relations with either France or Great Britain, or both, in compliance with Nasser's wishes, thus demonstrating support to Egyptian leadership (sic). The Lebanese President took the

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initiative to invite the Heads of the Arab State for a summit meeting in Beirut.

Psychological Environment: Lebanon's decision-makers, Camille Chamoun (Shamun), President of the Republic, and the Prime Minister Abdallah Yafi had different perceptions of the environmental change.

Abdallah Yafi, Muslim-Sunni, perceived that the continuation of Lebanon's diplomatic relations with England and France was against the principle of Arab solidarity advocated by Nasser; to be a member of the "Arab family," Lebanon should align itself instinctively, starting with its foreign policy. According to his belief system, Yafi considered that failure to do so was betraying Nasser, the Arab cause, and ipso facto the National Pact of 1943.

Chamoun's perceptions were expressed publicly before the Arab Summit Meeting in Beirut. On 13 December, when presiding at the decisive session of the Arab League, he said:

> Within twenty-four hours after French and British armed intervention, I had asked for an urgent summit meeting and had sent repeated calls. My aim was to propose to your agreement a unified action of all members of the Arab League with the formal hope that a real coalition of these countries, by its immediate effects, its moral significance and its projected influence, would have stopped the military operations launched by the Occidental powers. But now that the conference is held after the complete cessation of fighting in Egypt, I consider that break-off of diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain today has merely secondary importance.[2]

Chamoun continued stressing that Lebanon would assume its responsibilities and that the only condition for deciding any act would be unanimity, because only this unanimity will ensure the authority and efficiency of any projected decision. Following these discussions, he presented the Lebanese proposals which were adopted unanimously. All Arab delegations during the closing session expressed their thanks for Lebanon and its President, without whom such excellent results would not have been possible.

The President's decision to maintain Lebanon's diplomatic relations with both England and France produced an internal environmental change: Premier Yafi and State Minister Saeb Salam resigned; within three days, their coreligionist Sami Sulh was appointed Prime Minister, and Charles Malek, former Ambassador to Washington and distinguished scholar, became Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the feedback process, no tangible or sharp increase in threat was perceived within the internal setting at this time.

Second Enviromental Change

On 8 February 1957, after a week of negotiations, King Saud agreed with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the vital importance of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and on other provisions constituting the major issues of the coming Eisenhower Doctrine. The U.S. penetration into the core ring of the

Middle East Subordinate System produced a second environmental change, which had a cumulative, hostile effect on Lebanon.

The negotiations started on 14 March 1957 in a friendly and confident atmosphere between President Eisenhower's special envoy Ambassador James Richards and the Lebanese Government. The talks ended on 16 March. A press release outlined the provisions of the agreement approved by Lebanon's Council of Ministers. The agreement outlined the principles of cooperation (based on independence, mutual respect and sovereignty), the firm decision to defend their territorial integrity, and the freedom to choose their political system and culture. The signatories opposed any form of interference in internal affairs; they considered international communism a threat to national independence; they were devoted to social and economical progress of their people and welcomed cultural and economical links; both of them shared the belief that pacific solutions must be applied to potential problems in the area. Then, a few examples of American assistance were outlined to Lebanese public opinion, showing all the economic advantages of this cooperative policy with the United States.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was perceived as genuine and unselfish American cooperation by leaders who supported it, but was denounced by Nasser's Egypt and its satellite

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countries. Both attitudes were direct consequences of the respective belief systems and the perception of an actor of the global system, the United States, penetrating the Middle East subordinate system. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria agreed on 12 March 1956 to unite their armed forces. One month later, a unified military command was established in Egypt, most probably pointed toward Israel. Simultaneously, the U.S. military planners were directed to begin planning for "contingency operations" in the Middle East. Trial plan SWAGGERSTICK envisaged the disembarkation of U.S. troops in the Middle East. One possible avenue of approach was Beirut seaport. The plan was an outcome of the perceived rising threat of Nasserism and of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which proved to be an unsatisfactory approach for super-power rivalry in the Middle East. At least, this policy had the advantages to encourage Saudi Arabia to a more reasonable stand and strengthen the Jordanian position,3 as well as to timidly support Lebanon's attachment to western values and ethics.

Psychological Environment

a. Lebanon's self image was personified by its President Camille Chamoun who represented Lebanon at the United Nations and headed a Lebanese delegation to the Arab League. He advocated strong international relations and believed in Arab cooperation. Lebanon maintained an active

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role in regional affairs. Most of the Arab Leaders and
Heads of State officially visited Lebanon. All Nationals
of Arab States could enter the country without visas since
1953; Lebanon was a second home for every Arab citizen.
Prosperity was at its peak, culture, commerce, music and
theatre reached the summit in the region; the "cite
sportive" was the best and most complete sport center in the
entire Middle East.

b. Lebanon's perception of the U.A.R.'s image was
guided by factual and objective reasons. The Lebanese
government viewed Nasser's internal economic measures
nefarious to Egypt, and his policy a political threat to
Lebanon's individuality. Victim of his own propaganda,
Nasser moved quickly in the wrong direction. He was
ignorant of the essential elementary components of the Arab
world. He could not realize that the Arab-Muslim Empire
conquered Egypt and not vice-versa. He ignored the
particularities and the roots of each Arab Community and its
pride. He did not know that Egypt was a new comer into the
Arab politics to which it adhered as late as 1940 and that
none of its small intellectual elite had a key active part
in the Arab Awakening;[4] a movement directed against Ottoman
rule, initiated as soon as 1868 in Beirut. The Christian
Lebanese poet Yazigi sounded "the clarion call" of the
political awakening.

> Arise, O Arabs, from sleep awake!
> Knee deep we've sunk in misery's lake.[5]

Nasser had borrowed from the Ba'th the slogans of Arab unity, socialism, freedom and revolution; Nasserism paid lip service to Islam and took advantage of it. Very popular, Nasserism became politically stronger than the Ba'th which advocated secularism. Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Lebanese Phalanges Party which dedicated itself to the service of Lebanon observed how the Copts[6] were treated in Egypt and how Nasser down graded them to second class citizens. Jean Larteguy reported the following numerical facts: Out of 360 deputies in the Eygptian parliament, the Christian Copts, who were over 10 percent of the population, had only six deputies and they were nominated by Nasser but not elected by the people. None of the 160 senior positions of the public administration were accessible to them. Out of over 600 ministerial directorates, only 30 were coptic, out of 170 deans of faculty there was only one Copt, out of over 100 ambassadors, only 3 Copts were nominated in minor diplomatic posts abroad.[7]

Gemayel's political party, the predominantly Christian Lebanese Phalanges, supported the establishment; with their leader they were fearful that the treatment of Lebanon's Christians and others within Nasser's pan-Arabism would be similar to that of the Copts 'n the United Arab

Republic under Nasser.8 He who had neither the political

ability of Cavour nor the assets of a Garibaldi or a

Bismark. Even if Nasser had all the above qualities Chamoun

felt that Nasser's Egypt lacked the historical experience

and development which would make it the natural leader of

the Arab World.9

Although Nasser had appropriated the general slogans

of Pan-Arabism, he failed to establish general Egyptian

hegemony in the region. After the proclamation of the

U.A.R., Nasser adopted the traditional claim of Syrian

Nationalism over Lebanon.

Nasser's perception of the independent and liberal

government established in Lebanon was clearly reported in a

letter to the President from the Lebanese Ambassador at

Cairo as early as February 1957:

> Nasser does not govern Egypt alone, he is
> surrounded by several assistants; they hate you (C.
> Chamoun) and Sami Sulh (Premier) and every Head of
> Lebanese Government which does not receive
> instructions from Cairo or from the Egyptian
> Ambassador at Beirut.[10]

The letter, taking into consideration the Syrian attitude,

ended on this prophetic conclusion: in the month to come we

will endure from the Egyptian and Syrian sides numerous

assaults in which all means will be utilized.

The adhesion of Lebanon to the Eisenhower Doctrine

was not to improve that image. Nasser's U.A.R. perceived in

that option the consecration of Lebanon's individuality and

its independent policy. To be the first country in the Arab world to accept such a commitment in foreign relations was considered provocative; it challenged Nasser's self image as an Arab Leader. The Eisenhower Doctrine was viewed in general as incompatible with the Arab League Covenant. As a matter of fact, on 5 April 1957, the commentator of the "Voice of the Arabs" from Cairo was telling his large audience in the Arab world and especially in Lebanon that:

> The government of Sami Sulh accepted the Eisenhower plan; that is agreed to cooperate with the United States, the ally of Britain and France, who are in turn the two allies of Israel. In other words, it accepted alliance with the aggressors against Egypt and the Arabs. This cooperation and alliance is undertaken by the Lebanese Government with the West--at the very moment when the United States supports Israel's ambition against Aqabah and the (Suez) Canal 11

This was a sample of April's press campaign against the pro-western foreign policy of the Lebanese Government.

The internal opposition started to organize a popular resistance mainly in the Basta and Mazraa regions of Beirut. At the political level, seven deputies resigned from their functions in support of the opposition; on 9 April 1957, the Chamber under its President, Adil Usayran (Shi'a) acknowledged the resignation fact without further comments. Anyway, the Parliament's term was due to expire in a few months and the electoral campaign for the new Parliament was well under way. Electoral speeches by opposition candidates reached the frenzy of verbal violence,

urging the supporters to armed insurgency. On 30 May, hostile manifestations were held in Beirut, numerous demonstrators were armed with pistols and cudgels.

The decisions taken in respect with Lebanon's fundamental aspirations towards two environmental changes threatened the internal stability in 1956 and 1957. On both occasions the decision-makers affirmed Lebanon's pro-Western foreign policy and entrusted the Army Commander the mission of maintaining the internal security to accomplish his mission. He had operational control over the gendarmerie and the police. Coordinating instructions and a contingency plan had been established. Paragraph three of the plan directed the forces to maintain security, to repress any destructive attempts or armed activity, and to pursue and arrest offenders.

Feedback process. The armed forces had accomplished their duty with their traditional dedication. They restored order in the country and brought the disturbed areas to normal way of life. Security and stability were reinstated and authority returned to the civilian control of the Ministry of Interior; the internal situation was apparently so calm that President Chamoun as early as October 1957, visited Spain and Greece officially and in April 1958, Lebanon hosted the Royal Hellenic family for six days of popular and official festivities . . . Nevertheless, the feedback revealed that the operational environment in its

three components strongly favored the overflow of the Middle East crisis into Lebanon.

Firstly, Lebanon's external setting was dominated by the fever of Arabism, socialism and revolution; the core ring was hostile to the governmental establishment.

Secondly, the democratic setting offered easy access to the Lebanese opposition of Nasserist tendencies.

Thirdly, some foreign paid "journalists and commentators" taking advantage of the "moral authority" of some occidental publishers such as the Middle East Institute of Washington and of some foreign reporters seeking sensational news "explained the government success by pretending that the elections of 1957 had been falsified."[12] The motive, it was alleged, was the unstated wish of the President to modify the constitution in order to make possible his re-election."[13] The proof for such allegation was not forthcoming, but nevertheless, the allegations did their damage.

The union between Egypt and Syria in February 1958 brought Nasser geographically closer to Lebanon. In Damascus, Nasser was cheered and surrounded every day by an enthusiastic crowd. A total of three hundred thousand Lebanese went to see him and expressed openly their admiration of the newly born Arab Republic.[14] The most excited "fans" urged the "Rayes" to engulf Lebanon in the

U.A.R., the nucleous of Arab unity. The zealous followers
and admirers of Nasser with important Lebanese political
personalities such as Abdallah Yafi, Saeb Salam and Kamal
Jumblat who failed to be elected as members of parliament in
June 1957, constituted the opposition leaders to the
governmental majority.

The set-up for Lebanon's conflagration was
completed, pending the adequate spark. It came on 8 May
1958 when the journalist Nassib Metni was mysteriously
assassinated.

3. Crisis Period 9 May 1958-6 July 1958.

   a. A Sharp Threat Increase

Nassib Metni, a pro-communist, publisher and owner
of "The Telegraph", was also "in favor of strengthening
relations with the U.A.R." and a severe critic of Chamoun;
he was assassinated on 8 May early in the morning. "The
murder shook the country as nothing had done before."15 The
events that followed were perceived as a sharp threat
increase in the environmental change which started the
Crisis period.

   b. Dimensions of the Crisis

   (1) The source dimension of 1958 crisis fell into
two broad categories: external and internal threats.

      --The directed external hostile acts emanating
from the U.A.R. challenged Lebanon's legitimacy. Radio
Cairo incited the Lebanese opposition, "the struggling

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people against their traitorous and assassin rulers." Cairo urged the people to inflict punishment on Lebanese governmental officials and called for escalation of opposition's exigencies. 10 May: "We wonder, does the Lebanese President wish to remain in office?" 21 May: "The resignation of Chamoun is no longer sufficient--a quick trial and a drastic sentence is required in such circumstances." When Chamoun's Prime Minister announced that there is no amendment of the constitution to seek re-election, the opposition's reaction was inspired loudly and clearly by the U.A.R. radio commentors.

28 May: "This is not enough. Chamoun must go. He must leave the palace and the seat of rule, for he cannot stay in office . . . "

The directed external hostility became more dangerous when it overlooked the personage itself to attack deeper the issue . . . "The existence of Chamoun or his kind means that Lebanon will remain a center for plots . . . Chamoun therefore must go. To us Chamoun is not specifically Camille alone, but represents every enemy of the Arab people and peace. So strike, and strike again, beloved Lebanese people . . ."

--Internally also, verbal hostile acts challenged the establishment; they echoed and elaborated the themes emitted by "Radio Cairo," "Voice of the Arabs" and

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"Radio Damascus," which could not spend all their time to support the Lebanese opposition. Consequently four radio stations appeared in the opposition held sectors and continued to challenge the authorities appealing to the people to revolt. These radio stations were "Voice of Free Lebanon" (North), the "Torch" and "Voice of Arabism" (Beirut), and finally the "Voice of the Revolution".

Hostile physical acts took the form of general strikes to force the downfall of Chamoun's government under the pressure of a manipulated public opinion. In Tripoli the manifestations took immediately a dangerous turn. On 9 May (the day after the assassination of the Christian journalist) demonstrators leaving the Mosque clashed with the internal security forces giving the departure signal to the armed rebellion. Muslim sectors in Beirut began to barricade themselves and came under opposition control. Sidon also came under the authority of opposition leader Ma'ruf Sa'd. In the Shuf, Jumblat established the nucleous of a governmental organization, Ballbak and Hirmil joined in the armed opposition. The U.A.R. provided weapons and ammunition, the Syrian district dispatched "advisors" and provided manpower.

(2) The gravity of the crisis became more tangible when evaluated in terms of basic value threatened. Although the survival of the Lebanese population was not in direct danger of extermination, a forced total Arab assimilation

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was perceived by the majority which supported the government. Lebanon's independence as international actor and within the regional system was threatened by subordination to the U.A.R.'s leadership. The autonomy of the political system was under permanent threat; invitation to join the union was permanently formulated by the Governor of the Syrian district pointing out that "the new republic (U.A.R.) is the best guarantee of Lebanon's existence."

In private as well as in public, U.A.R.'s official considered the union with Lebanon most welcomed whenever Lebanon "may so desire by merger, or by federation . . . ." All the opposition supported the idea but "needed more time."16 The gravity dimension of the crisis was enlarged by the direct threat to Lebanon's economy which found itself completely cut off from its Arab hinderland.

(3) The intensity of the 1958 crisis in Lebanon would be determined by the volume of hostile acts perpetrated along the crisis period. In fact, the aggressive acts ranged from mild to grave and was always contained by the Army. The military forces were able to accomplish successfully any mission and did not hesitate to use the air force assets when intelligence reports showed that non-Lebanese fighters had infiltrated and were preparing for a decisive attack.

(4) The duration of the crisis was three months.

(5) The complexity of the crisis may be defined in terms of "quantity" and "uncertainty". In quantitative terms, the crisis of 1958 followed a progressive escalation. It started with internal political opposition and soon became encouraged by external verbal hostile acts. The succeeding phases of open armed conflict or revolution was also receiving external support. The complexity of the crisis augmented under the circumstances of uncertainty concerning the efficiency of the Eisenhower Doctrine towards Lebanon; another element of uncertainty was the amplitude of operational and logistic support that the armed opposition could get from abroad.

3. *Psychological Environment*

The political opposition and the "revolutionary factions" versus the government establishment supported by the Phalanges Party and the Syrian Nationalist Party (P.P.S.). The Lebanese army was in charge of the security.

The political opposition was constituted of Christian and Muslim leaders who disagreed with the internal policy followed by President Chamoun and the Cabinet. They disapproved the presidential pressures to influence the parliamentary elections17 as well as the liberal tendency of the Cabinet especially when not palatable to Nasser's U.A.R.

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The revolutionaries comprised a Muslim[18] armed
majority which advocated Nasserism, and/or sought the change
of the political structure of Lebanon and/or favored union
with the U.A.R. In such circumstances, communism[19] found
the adequate environment to play its own sheet of music
against Lebanon's liberal structures.

The political leadership under the direction of
Chamoun was composed according to the traditional political
pattern: Sami Sulh (Sunni), prime minister; Usayran
(Shi'a), the speaker who acknowledged the resignation of the
seven deputies without making a parliamentary issue out of
it; Emir Majid Arsland (Druze), was Minister of Agriculture;
Charles Malek (Greek Orthodox) at the foreign affairs. This
governing elite shared the President's image of the
environment as examined before. Gemayel's Party shared the
views of its leader and ever since personified the Christian
majority and Maronite attitudinal prism.

The P.P.S., founded by Antun Sa'ade joined the
governmental front. This party which openly initiated for
Lebanon's integration in the "Natural Syria" had 25,000[20]
Muslim as well as Christian members. Its alliance with the
Phalanges (who advocated Lebanon's individuality) found a
common ground in the pro-western orientation of Lebanon and
its stand towards Arabity which disagreed with the militant
Pan-Arabism of Nasser. Both parties rejected the idea of

Egyptian hegemony over Lebanon. The P.P.S., which stood for the separation of church and state, perceived in the possible military success of pro-Nasserism in Lebanon, the decisive and mortal blow to its own existence as an ideological party. Therefore, the establishment enjoyed indirectly the support of the two parties while the army was tasked to maintain internal security.

The army, under the command of General Fuad Chehab perceived the crisis in its three dimensional aspects through the attitudinal prism of its national background and natural mission to protect Lebanon's assets: the national authority and the citizens.

The political dimension of the crisis was clearly perceived by the army decision-makers. However, since independence the army remained far from politics and avoided any immixture in such issues. Internal politics were depicted to members of the army as contrary to their sacred mission. Officers and enlisted men could not belong to a political party; they could not participate in parliamentary elections. Political questions were not to be debated between the military. This political neutralism of the Lebanese army strenthened at that time the democratic structures of Lebanon.

The revolutionary aspect of the crisis was perceived as well but as a threat that should be defeated.

In fact, the army proved to be at the level of its responsibilities and never failed to do its duty: a battalion commanded by Colonel A. Karam stood for three months hundreds of attacks by rebels supported by Syrian "volunteers". The units of Colonel F. Lahud also stopped for the same period the attacks from the Syrian borders. They ambushed and captured a column of rebels. "The morale of the troops remained very high until the end."[21] In Tripoli, the army "assumed principal responsibility, employing tanks, armored cars and heavy guns."[22] At every battle the army had the situation under control.

The hierarchical authority of the army was perceived with loyalty and dedication. When President Chamoun asked General Chehab what will be his attitude and the attitude of the army if the coalition forces seriously threatened the established authority, he answered textually that he is a loyal soldier committed to the execution of his government decisions.[23] In fact on 2 July 1958, when "revolutionary forces" surrounded Shimlan key terrain--top hills controlling Beirut's airport--thus threatening seriously the legal authority, the army intervened with two battalion-size task forces and close air support; it dismantled the attacking forces completely in four days.[24]

Coping Process

Within the governmental agencies the flow of informations never stopped and contacts between the decision-makers were permanent. However, there was two centers of decision-making. The first one centered around the President of the Republic and comprised the Prime Minister, Sulh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Malek and the entire Cabinet for decisive political and diplomatic issues. The second center of decision-making was the army headquarters which planned military operations and concentrated the firepower when and where it was needed in support of Lebanon's threatened values.

The alternatives offered to President Chamoun, the decision-maker, during this crisis period were the following.

--To comply with the opposition who insisted that the President must resign "now".

--To accept mediation efforts which basically proposed that the President would remain in office and would make a public statement of policy not to seek re-election, that the Sulh government would resign and would be replaced by a coalition government under General Chehab premiership which will remain in office until presidential election and end of crisis.

--To enjoy constitutional rights which allowed the President to remain in office until the end of his term; to keep the Sulh government as long as it had the confidence of the Chamber and to intrust the army the responsibility of the internal security.

The President also had other alternatives within the regional and global systems. By constitutional rights (Art. 52) he could appeal to the United States which may respond under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As head of the government President Chamoun could also lodge a protest against the U.A.R. and submit it to the Arab League and/or the Security Council of the United Nations.

The alternatives for General Chehab, as army decision-making authority were limited to three possibilities. To support the opposition and execute an easy coup d'etat; to support the establishment and within limits suppress the political opposition after defeating the armed revolution; the third possible choice was to preserve Lebanon's democratic structures when seriously threatened and to support democratic, political and constitutional solutions.

President Chamoun's decision was to maintain untouched the constitutional rights of the first presidency; General Chehab's option aimed to preserve Lebanon's individuality. The President and the General, under

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circumstances of stress, avoided "value trade-offs"; both of them relied on "general principles" as a guide to action.

The feedback analysis of the actions implemented by the government had direct effects on the environment.

The governmental actions within the Arab League and the Security Council, if they did not stop the hostilities, immediately showed an international interest (UN observers to Lebanon) while the repressive military actions against the revolutionary armed forces which showed decisiveness but not hate had the advantages to dismantle the attacks, to minimize the casualties and to discourage further attempts, thus preserving the national image of the army. An army for all the Lebanese but fiercely decided to accomplish its mission in preserving the internal security and the national values. In fact Jumblat noticed that the "failure of his offensive to occupy Beirut was due to the intentional failure of the opposition leaders in Beirut to support him, by suddenly silencing the operations of their forces against the government." When Shimlan Battle ended by the total victory of the army a short statement confirmed that the "rebel" forces were totally dismantled. It was on 6 July 1958 when a perceived threat decrease announced the post-crisis period.

4. The Post-Crisis Period (1958-1960)

    a. Environmental Change.

On 14 July 1958 an unexpected, violent and successful coup d'etat that occurred in Iraq the center of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact. An important element of "uncertainty" was suddenly introduced to the "complexity" of the Middle East crisis. This sudden event had direct and immediate influence on the balance of power of the Middle East subordinate system. The Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan, situated on the periphery ring with Saudi Arabia, was in a balance of power with Nasser's U.A.R. (Egypt and Syria) of the core circle. The simultaneous perception of this sharp increase in threat to the regional system by the U.S. decision-makers and the increased concern of the Lebanese President about the outcome of the internal crisis caused the U.S. Military to penetrate the Middle East subordinate systems and precisely to land in Beirut.

The penetration of the United States, the major pole of the Global System, into the Middle East subordinate system through Lebanon had two dimensions: world-wide known military intervention and almost forgotten politico-diplomatic mission of special envoy Murphy in Lebanon.

Psychological Environment

(1) U.S. Attitudinal Prism

a. The U.S. military intervention in Lebanon began 15 July when the 2d U.S. Marine Battalion established a beachhead and moved toward Beirut international airport.

The following day additional combat marines came ashore across the bathing beaches in front of Beirut's expensive hotels. One private looked at the cluster bikini-clad young women who were taking the sun, idly watching the operation or wholly indifferent. He put down his rifle, thoughtfully scanned the scene, and proclaimed in tones of wonder and appreciation: "So this is Eye-Rack."[25]

Although the largest American intervention between Korea and Vietnam, the U.S. military forces did not engage in military operations to support the establishment or to influence the outcome of the Lebanese crisis. The titles of reminiscences written by a military participant stand without further comment: "who's a rebel? The Lesson Lebanon Taught" and "Orders Firm but Flexible."[26] In fact the U.S. military presence in Lebanon helped to improve the elite images of the United States among the opposition leaders. "For the Americans, the question that became uppermost was how to maintain peace without disturbing the Basta."[27] The Basta being that district of Beirut declared off limits and which constituted the bastion of the "rebels." It was near the Basta that "several American soldiers were captured and relieved of their weapons, but later were released." No source identified the captors and no fighting took place. A simple "show of force" at the very edge of this bastion diminished the tension. This "no fighting policy" became a standing operation procedure issued after the beachhead was established, LTC Hadd reported the issue:

> When a youngster lands all prepared and eager to
> fight and finds himself restricted from firing at a
> known rebel who he sees periodically fire in his
> direction and in every instance restrains himself
> from returning the fire, it is felt that this is
> outstanding and indicates good small unit
> discipline.[28]

Therefore the U.S. military involvement in Lebanon was

ordered in the perspective of larger issues. These issues

were entrusted to Murphy "the diplomat among warriors."

b. The politico-diplomatic mission of R. Murphy, the

special envoy of the U.S. President was carried out within

Lebanon in its political dimension. His diplomatic tour

throughout the Middle East Subordinate System aspired to

reestablish a balance of power favorable to the United

States.

Murphy arrived in Lebanon on 17 May. His "oral

instructions from the President were conveniently vague" and

it was obvious to him "as the President's personal

representative was going to demand an altogether different

type of diplomacy."[29]   Upon his arrival to Beirut, Murphy

paid a visit of courtesy to Chamoun, the President of the

host country. After a quick estimate of the situation,

Murphy "urged Chamoun and the Head of Parliament . . . to

hold an election without delay." In order to bring

"relaxation to the prevailing tensions."[30]

It was also essential for Murphy before the election

to "talk with some influential rebel leaders in order to

explain American policy to them and try to gain their cooperation."31   Forgetting his diplomatic title and the prestige which goes with it, driven by his mission Murphy went to their bastions--a mission which would take him across Lebanon.   Because Saeb Salam was inaccessible at the Basta, an old fiend of Murphy "arranged a secret meeting outside Beirut" with two of Saeb Salam's henchmen.   Murphy spent hours of conversation with them.   This meeting "seemed to mark a turn in events" and a few days later Murphy was "able to meet Saeb Salam himself and talk with him in the Basta."   His next contact was Junblat "in his stronghold" in the Shuf and finally Rashid Karami "whose secret hideout was on the seacoast near Tripoli."

On 31 July, General Fuad Chehab became the President Elect; Murphy was not present to congratulate him.   The U.S. special envoy had left "Lebanon on the eve of the election in order to minimize charges of American interference in the voting."32

Having gained the cooperation of the opposition, Murphy dedicated himself to accomplish larger issues within the Middle East Subord⁺·ᵒₜₑ System directly related to the politico-military intervention by the United States.   The U.S. military intervention in Lebanon was decided by Eisenhower himself: "the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World) and in doing

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so to risk general war with the Soviet Union or to do something worse--which was to do nothing."33   In fact, not to respond at Lebanon's appeal, the only country of the Arab World which supported the "Eisenhower Doctrine" would be interpreted by Arabs and especially by Nasser as if "Americans were capable only of words," or they were afraid of the Soviets.34   Therefore the U.S. President "wanted to demonstrate in a timely and practical way that the United States was capable of supporting its friends." Murphy had to carry out that mission and reestablish a balance of power favorable to Washington within the Middle East.   After visiting Jordan, Israel and the new revolutionary but friendly government of Iraq Murphy "received word through the Egyptian Ambassador" in Beirut that Nasser would also welcome his visit.   "Nasser was intensely interested in the American intervention in Lebanon" and "he was pleased with the choice of General Chehab."35   In fact "Nasser had suggested precisely such a solution a month earlier." Nasser's solution was not only "a priori unacceptable"36; it had to be implemented "over the strong cbjections of Premier Said",37 head of the pro-American government of Baghdad who was murdered upon the coup d'etat of 14 July. Nasser, the unchallenged leader of the Arab World became a potential valuable friend that should be pleased.

At the end of his tour, Murphy had gathered signs of sympathy from all the Arab World and mainly from Nasser while in Lebanon a Christian dissatisfaction exploded in the streets.

(2) Lebanese Attitudinal Prism:

The Lebanese Parliament elected on the second ballot General Chehab by a vote of 48 to 7 for Raymond Edde' and one blank. Although supporting the election of Chehab, Chamoun remained in office until the very last day of his term. On 23 September, Chehab acceeded to the first Presidency. The next day he nominated 8 Ministers with Rashid Karami Premier. All the Ministers were from the opposition but one was neutral.38 Karami, the new Premier declared that this Cabinet came "to harvest the fruits of the revolution"39 Gemayel, leader of the Phalanges Party declared that such Cabinet represented an "unjustified victory for the rebels" and that his party "cannot but oppose this government."40 This opposition was so effective that it reached whatever is Christian and paralyzed the internal structures. "Since the Arab conquest, never had the Christians affirmed their existence with such aggressive vigor."41 The only possible solution was to remodel the Cabinet. Edde and Gemayel, both Maronite leaders, shared the responsibility with Premier Karami and Uwayni both Muslim-Sunni. The "no victor, no vanquished" slogan which

accompanied this "salvation" cabinet became a rallying
clarion; the hostilities ended on 14 October.

(3) Elite Images.

Fuad Chehab images of the operational environment
during the entire period of the Crisis of 1958 was perceived
through the Triple Screen of nobility, military and policy.

Emir Fuad Chehab belongs to this large and noble
family which gave independent Lebanon Christian and Muslim
leaders. Khaled Chehab (Muslim-Sunni) became the President
of the Cabinet on 19 April 1953 and Abdel-Aziz Chehab
(Maronite), a distinguished Prince, is a direct descendant
of Emir Bashir last ruler of the Emirate; his intelligence
and sharp wit43 made him a brilliant and sociable leader.
Adel Chehab, another distinguished General, who commanded
the army is the direct descendant of Emir Yussof, son of
Emir Melhem, the first Shehabi Emirs. Fuad Chehab was the
son of Abdallah son of Hasan son of Abdallah, son of Hasan
the brother of Beshir the last Shehabi Emirs whose rule
ended in two decades of bloody disturbances (a historical
and psychological prism).

General Fuad Chehab graduated from the French
Military Academy at St. Cyr and L'Ecole Superieur de Guerre
at Paris. He became the first commanding officer of the
Lebanese Army upon the withdrawal of the last French
detachment. He married a french lady but had no children.
His social life was very limited and selective. He loved

his army and his "principal preoccupation seemed to be to keep his military establishment intact."[44]

Politics did not appeal to the General. Urged to form a Cabinet during the crisis, mediation efforts by the Patriarch failed: "I tried to convince him, but he declined. Later he accepted, but then he telephoned . . . He told the Vicar General that he could not accept after all."[45] Fuad Chehab never wanted to be involved in politics; he did not make one single attempt to remain in office when he headed a government for a few weeks in 1952 and the President of the Republic resigned.

Although a senior field grade officer during the last period of struggle for independence in 1943, Chehab did not share the events to which participated politically (Khuri & Sulh) diplomatically (Chamoun) and popularly (Gemayel) among others of distinguished Muslim and Christian personalities.

Therefore President Fuad Chehab, who enjoyed high intelligence, honesty and integrity had the best elite images, of the circumstances of his election and of Lebanon's operational environment in order to make the best choice among the alternatives offered to him.

(4) Alternatives and Choices.

President Chehab perceived the reality of the operational environment, and the U.S. relationship within

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the Middle East Subordinate System. He became aware that an actor of the Global System can penetrate the Subordinate System to change it but the contrary was not true. Within the Subordinate System, Chehab perceived Nasser the uncontestable Arab leader who was making the headlines of the regional press. The voluminous Lebanese mass media was free to report Nasser's feats. The U.A.R. Ambassador, Ghaleb, "who had been declared persona non grata during the events of 1958 was admitted to hold again his activities"[46] and an Arab law school was established in Beirut.

President Chehab perceived the need to reorganize the administration of Lebanon as a state and did it. His collaborators gave the social dimension the supremacy over the political dimension and lost progressively the support of militant Lebanese Christians: first Edde, then Gemayel. Chamoun was not already close.

General Fuad Chehab, the President, perceived his army getting more and more involved in the internal politics from which he had always firmly kept out himself. Now that he was involved, the army was following . . . He did not like it; had he another choice?

The "salvation" Cabinet of four was enlarged to include five new ministers; Raymond Edde had resigned to start a political but democratic opposition. In 1960, the controversial parliament was dissolved and new elections were held according to a new electoral law which raised the

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numbers of deputies from 66 to 99. "The 1960 elections can be regarded in a real sense as marking the true-end of the Lebanese Crisis of 1958." The most surprising aspect of these elections was that "the extremist elements on all sides were elected, while the moderate went under."[47] Their most significant aspect was that Gemayel's Phalanges Party had the highest number of party members elected. President Chehab acknowledged these facts.

Two days after the Chamber elected its Speaker, the President of the Republic, General Chehab resigned . . . Organized manifestations came from all districts to show popular support and to convince him to continue his term of office . . . with clear vision Chehab recognized that he had no alternative but to remain.

CHAPTER V

NOTES

[1]N. Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) pp. 356-57.

[2]Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient (Montrouge, France: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 307-8. The French text has been translated by the author.

[3]The United States quickly responded to Jordan's request for aid on 13 April 1957 against an attempted take-over by pro-Nasser elements.

[4]Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient, p. 343.

5Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 477.

[6]Copt ("Gyptos" from the Greek "Aigyptos" which means Egyptian). They remained Christian within the Islamic empires which ruled Egypt.

[7]Larteguy, Y. Dieu, l'or et le sang (Evreux: Presses de la cite, 1980) p. 31.

[8]Ibid. p. 30. "We the Maronites will never be like the Copt. We will never accept to become citizens of second zone and to behave as a "carpet" in front of muslim masters."

[9]Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient, p. 344.

10Ibid., p. 324.

[11]Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 52.

12Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient, p. 385.

[13]Qubain, Crise au Moyen-Orient, p. 65. President Shamun (Chamoun) never explicitly stated in public that he would run. This writer, however, was told by a western diplomat of impeachable authority that . . . . Note 23, the person concerned asked him not to reveal his name.

14All radio bulletins cited hereafter are from Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, app. III.

15Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, pp. 68-69.

16Ibid., p. 171.

17Ibid., p. 57. President Chamoun offered to a candidate an ambassador function if he withdrew in favor of Charles Malek, the pro-American Minister of Foreign Affairs.

18Kamal Junblat wrote, "The mistake the revolution made in the countryside was its failure to supply Christian groups in the opposition with arms." Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, p. 50.

19"The communists, all through the Lebanese crisis, were an unwanted [sic] and embarrassing ally to the opposition." Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, p. 56.

20Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, p. 85.

21Chamoun, _Crise au Moyen-Orient_, p. 408.

22Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, p. 74.

23Chamoun, _Crise au Moyen-Orient_, p. 409.

24Qubain, _Crisis in Lebanon_, p. 78.

25Townsend Hoopes, _The Devil and John Foster Dulles_ (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1973), p. 436.

26H. A. Hadd, respectively in _Marine Corps Gazette_ 46, no. 3 (March 1962), pp. 50-53, and _United States Naval Institute Proceedings_ 88, no. 10 (October 1962), pp. 81-89.

27Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon," _Leavenworth Paper_ no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), p. 43.

28Spiller, "Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon," p. 41.

29Robert Murphy, _Diplomat Among Warriors_ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964), p. 398.

30Ibid., p. 404.

31Ibid., p. 406.

32Ibid., p. 408.

[33] Dwight David Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 178.

[34] Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 398.

[35] Ibid., p. 411.

[36] James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1976), p. 255.

[37] The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., chronological events.

[38] This event is reported by the Congressional Quarterly, Inc., as such: "September 22. Lebanon's pro-Western cabinet resigns. Rashid Karami, a rebel leader, becomes Premier September 24. The United States September 27 assures Karami of continued U.S. support."

[39] K. S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York, Praeger, 1966), p. 203.

[40] Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 158.

[41] Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historique du Liban Politique et Constitutionnel (Beirut, Lebanon: P.U.L., 1973), p. 543.

[42] Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 164.

[43] Once Emir Abdul-Aziz was asked in French if he was SHIHABIST. He answered "There is no SHIHABIST, there is Shiha-bien (good) and Shihab pas bien (no good).

[44] Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 400.

[45] Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 87.

[46] Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient, p. 430.

[47] Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 165.

CHAPTER VI

CRISES OF 1975-76

A. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Global system: The United States and the Soviet Union were already in a bipolar balance of power. But other centers of influence appeared on the international scene. Some oil-producing countries belonging to the third world became aware of their growing economical importance after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They captured the attention of the two superpowers, as well as the interest of other potential actors in the global system. Therefore, the third world became divided between rich and poor countries, and the total web of international relations turned into a loose bipolar, polycentric global system (see figure 3). Western Europe and Japan were looking towards the oil-rich countries, while China was searching for a leadership role within the third world. It is in such an international milieu that the United States in its concern for majors issues in the area dedicated its diplomacy to promote the peace process in the Middle East Subordinate System in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Subordinate System: The Middle East subordinate System in the seventies had with Lebanon on the core ring the following states: Egypt, Israel, and Syria. On the

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
Figure 3

periphery ring were Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. All other Arab countries, Turkey and Iran, constituted the outer ring of the Subordinate System (see figure 4). The Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had been recognized as "the heart of the conflict,"[1] had its armed forces concentrated in Lebanon, and its influence spanned all over the Arab countries.

MIDDLE EAST SUBORDINATE SYSTEM, 1975-76

Figure 4

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The Palestinian presence in Lebanon started in 1948, when, unable to defend their own country, the Palestinians came to find refuge in Lebanon. But since April 1968, when the first armed guerrillas entered Lebanon, the Palestinians had become aggressive. Three successive provocations toward the Lebanese Army by the Palestinians in 1969 ended on 3 November with the "Cairo Agreement," which compensated their military defeat; considerable pressure by Arab states on Lebanon made that document possible. In 1973, the Palestinian armed forces also engaged in open hostilities with the Lebanese. Martial law was proclaimed, and the Lebanese army reposted firmly by ground and air forces inflicting heavy casualties among the Palestinian guerrillas. The diplomatic intervention of Arab and Western countries made the Lebanese President order a cease-fire, if the Palestinians would be willing to make a new agreement that would accommodate Lebanese conditions. But, in fact, the Palestinians undertook the agreement as an annex to the "Cairo Agreement" of 1969 in order to confirm their previous privileges. On 15 May 1973, talks between Palestinian and Lebanese officers started in Beirut, while in Washington the "May 15 WSAG2 meeting lasted less than forty-five minutes and then it drifted off into a discussion of Lebanon's chronic crisis." Kissinger, however, did ask for two contingency plans. "The first was for the eventuality that Lebanon might get out of control." The second was related

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to "the kinds of things that the Egyptians might do," the Israeli reactions, and the way in which the United States "might use the crisis to get diplomatic movement, . . . or to return to the status quo ante."3

The situation in Lebanon, however, remained under control, and on 17 May the "Melkart agreement" was signed. Its purpose was, first, to regulate the Palestinian presence and weapons in the camps and on Lebanon's southern border; second, to control the movement of military and civilian personnel; third, to interdict training in the camps; fourth, to freeze all operations from Lebanese territory; fifth, to proclaim that the seat of the Palestinian central committee was in Damascus; sixth, not to implicate Lebanon in any informational Palestinian bulletins concerning Palestinian activities; seven, to comply with Lebanon's law; eighth, not to accept strangers (non-Arab Fedayins) except for humanitarian purposes; and, ninth, to entrust to the liaison center the control of the execution of the agreements.

B. PRECRISIS PERIOD: 6 OCTOBER 1973--13 APRIL 1975

1. Environmental Changes.

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian army conducted a surprisingly successful crossing of the Suez Canal and overran the first defensive line of the Israeli forces in the Sinai. Syria joined the war, attacking on the Golan

Heights. On 7 October, the Israeli forces counterattacked on both fronts. A few days later, Jordan announced its intention to join Egypt and Syria, while on the same day, the Israelis reported that an Iraqi division was fighting on the Syrian front. Concurrently, Saudi Arabian troops, urged by Sadat, attacked Israel. The Arab oil-producing states started to reduce the flow of oil to the United States and its Western allies for thier military or diplomatic support of Israel. Libya, which had cut off all oil exports to the United States, almost doubled the price of oil from $4.90 to $8.92 a barrel on 19 October. A few days later, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Dubai joined the embargo. On 22 October, a joint resolution sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union was adopted by the Security Council. It called for a cease-fire in the Middle East and the implementation of a previous resolution (242) to bring peace in the region. The resolution called for Israel to withdraw from territory occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Within the global system, the Soviet Union, which had massively withdrawn from Egypt few days before the outbreak of the war, received the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, in Moscow. The realistic policy advocated by the head of U.S. diplomacy encouraged the Soviets to cooperate with the Americans to implement peace through direct negotiations. Kissinger was given the mission of

facilitating a peace conference with the participation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Mideastern states, under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.S. secretary of state carried out his mission in holding a series of separate meetings with Arab and Israeli officials, implementing a "shuttle diplomacy."

2. Psychological Environment: U.S. Attitudinal Prism.

The U.S. State Department's attitudinal prism with respect to Lebanon's situation was conditioned by major strategic policies that reflected the elite images of its decision-makers.

The strategy of detente, as explained by Henry Kissinger in the "years of upheaval," regulated the relations between the two poles of the global system. It was "based on garnering support among moderate elements at home, avoiding appearing to our allies as a source of international tensions, giving the Soviets an opportunity for a resonable accommodation, but was never an end in itself."

The strategy for peace shaped the U.S. diplomacy within the Middle East Subordinate System. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, American public opinion urged President Nixon to take new initiatives for peace in the Middle East. This trend coincided with the strategy of detente pursued at the global level. On the regional level, the strategy that

Kissinger favored was "a prolonged stalemate that would move the Arabs towards moderation and the Soviets to the fringes of Middle East diplomacy."[4]

The foreign policy issue, to implement the strategic options, were consistent with the belief system of the decision-makers. They believed that realism should have supremacy over sentimental considerations. Realistic international relations and foreign policy issues would be better suited to protect national interests especially in an operational environment shaped with a strategy of detente. With realism, the secretary of state recognized the deadlock of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East: "the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) whose claim to represent all Palestinians was not yet recognized by the Arab states, called for the creation of a secular state in Palestine, that is to say, the disappearance of Israel." He also perceived Egypt as the "key to Middle East diplomacy."[5]

The perception of the State Department decision-makers about Lebanon was equally realistic: the Lebanese

> welcomed America's interest in the peace process; they had no concrete proposals. Their major concern was that the Soviet role in the Middle East be diminished and, above all, that [the United States] help solve the Palestinian problem, finding them a home anywhere other than Lebanon. [But Kissinger] did not have the heart to tell [the Lebanese President that from what he] had heard in the Middle East, [Lebanon] was unlikely to obtain relief from his devouring guests.[6]

2. Lebanon's Attitudinal Prism.

The outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 was
perceived by Lebanon to be as convenient as it appeared to
the United States, if not more. A complete and total
victory of the Arab armies was an alarming issue for the
Christian Lebanese. Through their traditional attitudinal
prism, they feared that in the excitement of an overwhelming
Arab victory, would threaten Lebanon's balanced
establishment.

The limited Arab victory permitted the Christian
Lebanese to accept the joy of their Muslim compatriots,
being proud of their Arabity without hidden internal
apprehension.

On the other hand, the American initiative for peace
in the Middle East was received with strong hope, as well as
with deep realism.

Sentimental Lebanese hoped that American ability to
find a homeland for the Palestinians would be the unique
solution to the growing internal Palestinian problem and its
threat to the pro-Western political establishment of
Lebanon.

Realistic Lebanese were sure that a peace process
was not going to be implemented soon and that the growing
Palestinian threat could become unbearable. Therefore,
Christian factions started to prepare themselves

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instinctively to survive any attempt of undesirable Palestinian hegemony, while Muslim factions organized themselves in harmony with the Palestinian organizations.

C. CRISIS PERIOD

Methodology

The whole pattern of international relations during the crises of 1975-76 was fluid, and alliances seemed to be ephemeral. Analysis, however, was limited to the relations of the United States as an actor of the global system with the inner circle of the Middle East Subordinate System.

The events for the analysis strictly reflected a U.S. perception. The chronological yearly events systematically selected from the Middle East Congressional Quarterly included those actions taken by and directed at Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Palestinians/PLO, the United States, and the United Nations. Starting with January 1975, each relevant entry in the chronological events was identified as being friendly, neutral, or hostile and was given a subjective weight to better describe how friendly or hostile the action was. Hostile acts received negative values ranging from one to five. The least hostile received a minus one, and, progressively, an act of war, the most hostile, received a minus five. Friendly acts were assigned positive values also ranging from one to five. The acts, whether friendly or hostile, were classified in two broad

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categories. The verbal acts, such as statements or proclamations, were given a value of one. The physical acts were divided into four major areas: diplomatic and political acts, such as participating or not in a conference or meeting when requested to do so; the "economical or other" acts (short of outright hostilities), such as boycotts or embargo removals; "limited military acts," such as troops movements, mobilization, or withdrawal; and, finally, the "operational acts" of war or peace. The weight assigned to these physical acts ranged respectively from two to five.

Each actor on the core ring of the Middle East Subordinate System, along with the United States and the United Nations, was provided separate "action logs." They were used to post the values assessed to any action that the actor undertook toward one or some of the others. For example, on 5 February 1980 an event entry reflected the U.S. agency's perception of that event as follows, "Egypt ends its participation in economic boycott of Israel." This received a plus three value on the 1980 Egyptian action log under the column of Israel. In fact, it is a friendly economic act by Egypt towards Israel. Another entry on 24 August 1980, which also reflected a U.S. image of the event, stated: "Israeli fighter planes down Syrian Mig-21 over southern Lebanon." In this case, the Israeli action log displayed a minus four under the Syrian column. It is worth

noting that the U.S. perceived neither a hostile nor a friendly act toward Lebanon. Therefore, in both Israeli and Syrian logs, this event reflected a neutral value. This method was pursued throughout the analysis. It was necessary to assess the international relations from a U.S. perspective. Then, the negative values were added for each column, as well as the positive values. The total of negative values indicated the amount of hostility that this country received, while the total of positive values showed the amount of friendliness. The algebraic sum of each column showed the predominant friendly or hostile relationship pursued during that year toward the country at the head of that column.

In order to capture the total web of interrelations within the core of the Middle East Subordinate System, according to the U.S. policy and perception, a matrix has been developed for each year. It comprises seven columns and seven raws. Each column was assigned to one actor, while on each raw was listed the respective algebraic sums that appeared on the "action log" of the country that had been assigned that raw.

Matrix Analysis

The mathematical sum of a raw reflects the overall image of a country as perceived from a U.S. standpoint. Consequently, the U.S. raw reflects the U.S. self image,

CRISIS PERIOD MATRICES

MATRIX: 1975

(1)

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	0	-9	+2	+3	-4	+12	/= +4
U.STATES	0	*	+14	+10	0	0	+5	/= +29
ISRAEL	-2	-1	*	+12	0	-2	-16	/= -9
EGYPT	0	+5	+7	*	0	0	-1	/= +11
SYRIA	0	-2	-2	-2	*	-2	0	/= -8
LEBANON	0	0	-1	0	0	*	-15	/= -16
PAL/PLO	0	-3	-13	-2	0	-17	*	/= -35
Freindly	0	+5	+21	+24	+3	0	+17	
Hostile	-2	-6	-25	-4	0	-25	-32	
Total	-2	-1	-4	+20	+3	-25	-15	

MATRIX: 1976

(2)

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	0	-13	0	0	0	+20	/+ 7
U.STATES	0	*	+2	+2	+1	0	+11	/+16
ISRAEL	0	0	*	+1	0	0	-2	/-1
EGYPT	0	0	0	*	+2	+1	+7	/+10
SYRIA	0	0	+3	+2	*	-10	+2	/-3
LEBANON	0	0	0	+1	+1	*	-9	/-7
PAL/PLO	0	+5	-10	+1	0	-7	*	/-11
Freindly	0	+5	+5	+7	+4	+1	+40	
Hostile	0	-0	-23	0	0	-17	-11	
Total	0	+5	-18	+7	+4	-16	+29	

while the algebraic figures on each other's raw, however questionable, indeniably reflects the friendliness-hostility image of that country as perceived through the attitudinal prism of U.S. foreign policy for the Middle East. Therefore, the U.S. self image was spotless, while positive sums meant a positive support for U.S. policy and negative totals reflected images of acts that hindered the implementation of such a policy in the Middle East Subordinate System. On the other hand, the columns described the support or the opposition that each country received from all other actors with respect to its own policy.

Interpretation of the Matrices

From the total web that the matrices offered for interpretation, only Lebanon's relations with the actors of the core ring of the Middle East Subordinate System are examined with respect to U.S. interests and policy towards the same actors.

1. 1975. The U.S. raw in the 1975 matrix displayed a positive score of +25 with no perception of hostile acts. The beneficiaries of that U.S. friendly policy were by order of priority: Israel (+14), Egypt (+10), and the Palestinians (+5). Thus, U.S. foreign policy for that area was carried out with Kissinger's views to break the deadlock for peace negotiations. A significant result, which

concerned traditional U.S. interest, was that Israel still reciprocated hostility (-16) with the Palestinians/PLO (-13), who enjoyed this year not only U.S. friendly moves, but also the support of the United Nations (+12).

Lebanon's raw in the same matrix presented a negative sum (-16) with no positive credits at all, which means that the United States perceived that Lebanon's hostility hindered its advocated policy for peace in the Middle East. In fact, the matrix showed that all the perceived hostility of Lebanon was only directed towards the Palestinians/PLO (-15). It is worth noting that Lebanon's hostility towards the Palestinians/PLO not only did not have the support of any actor on the matrix, but also, on the contrary, Lebanon received the reciprocated Palestinian's hostility (-17) and other hostilities (-8) to bear the highest score of matrix hostilities directed against it (-25).

2. 1976. As an actor's self image should be, the U.S. raw displayed no hostile acts but remained neutral towards Lebanon. The U.S. friendly acts were evenly distributed towards Israel (+2), Egypt (+2), and Syria (+1), but favored the PLO (+11), who also enjoyed extraordinary international support from the United Nations (+20) to the detriment of Israel (-13). The PLO reciprocated the U.S.

friendly attitude (+5) but remained hostile to Israel (-10), who timidly reacted (-2).

Lebanon's hostile image (-7) perceived by the U.S. agency was tempered by Lebanon's friendly attitude towards Egypt (+1) and Syria (+1). The latter surprisingly responded with a hostile attitude (-9) to Lebanon, who remained invariably hostile to the Palestinians (-9), who reciprocated (-7). Again, this year Lebanon did not have any support from the actors but a single favorable Egyptian statement (+1).

In fact, while the U.S. State Department was pursuing Kissinger's realistic policy for peace in the Middle East, Lebanon, who favored such policy, strongly supported the idea of a Palestinian homeland in order to get rid of the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. This issue was clearly perceived by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who wrote: "A Palestinian state could be formed only at the expense of Jordan's previous position in Palestine (Jordan had governed the West Bank from 1948 to 1967) and indeed its genesis would mark the opening of a struggle over the very existence of the Hashemite state EAST of the Jordan River. Leaders of the PLO had avowed frequently enough that the blood feud with Hssein was even deeper than that with Israel. And Hussein could count on little support from his fellow Arabs." Anyway, nobody could, and Lebanon much less than any other Arab country.

The analysis of the events of 1975 and 1976 supported "a priori" this assumption. Lebanon became the place where the "Palestinians can become a state within a state, first ignoring the writ of the central government in areas they control and then seeking to impose their own will."7 The PLO, encouraged by their international success and supported by the majority of the Lebanese Muslims, attempted to take over Lebanon and almost succeeded. Lebanon's hostile images for the years 1975 and 1976 reflected the Lebanese resistance to such an attempt. Kissinger knew from his diplomatic contacts with Arab leaders that "very few Palestinians would want to return to the West Bank whoever ruled there." Armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon was not an obstacle to Kissinger's program--on the contrary, it enhanced and eased it. "Since Israel would surely insist that any part of the West Bank returned to Arab control be demilitarized" and since it was impossible to disarm Palestinians by diplomatic means, "Lebanon was not likely soon to be spared the presence of armed Palestinians."8 It was the Christian opposition to the armed Palestinians that appeared to be a hindering attitude towards U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.

D. POSTCRISIS PERIOD

The matrix of 1977 showed an amount of U.S. friendly acts (+19) that favored by far the Palestinian/PLO actor

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(+17), who gained Egypt's friendliness (+9) while continuing
to enjoy the support of the international community (+10).

Lebanon hostile acts continued to be directed
towards the PLO (-13), who reciprocated hostility (-12)
while the U.S. agency perceived for the first year friendly
acts towards Lebanon (+10) coming from Israel, who directed
its perceived hostility towards the PLO (-13).

This first support of Lebanon perceived by the U.S.
agency in the year 1977 would be considered as the
beginning of the postcrisis period. In fact, Lebanon did
survive this two-year crisis just enough to witness the
change of administration at the head of the State Department
and the departure of Dr. Henry Kissinger, who wrote about
Lebanon:

> I think with sadness of these civilized men who in a
> turbulent part of the world had fashioned a
> democratic society based on genuine mutual respect
> of the religions. Their achievement did not
> survive.9

In fact, the Lebanese themselves, during this two-year
crisis period, under the overwhelming ghost of Palestinian-
Muslim hegemony, mutually denounced the National Pact of
1943.

Since the moment that the Palestinian threat was
contained all Lebaneseworked again together in order to
rebuild a renewed Lebanon on the basis of peaceful
coexistence. It appeared that despite the U.S. neutral

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POSTCRISIS PERIOD MATRICES

(3)

MATRIX: 1977

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	0	-12	0	0	0	+10	/-2
U.STATES	0	*	-1	+1	+1	0	+17	/+18
ISRAEL	0	-3	*	+3	-1	+10	-13	/-4
EGYPT	0	+4	+14	*	-4	0	+9	/+23
SYRIA	0	+2	-2	-6	*	0	0	/-6
LEBANON	0	0	0	-1	0	*	-13	/-14
PAL/PLO	0	-2	-3	-3	-1	-12	*	/-21
Freindly	0	+6	+14	+4	+1	+10	+36	
Hostile	0	-5	-18	-10	-6	-12	-26	
Total	0	+1	-4	-6	-5	-2	+10	

(4)

MATRIX: 1978

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	0	0	0	0	+2	0	/+2
U.STATES	0	*	+2	+16	+2	0	0	/+20
ISRAEL	0	+1	*	+8	0	+6	-13	/+2
EGYPT	0	+11	-1	*	0	0	-5	/+5
SYRIA	0	-2	-1	-3	*	-17	0	/-23
LEBANON	0	0	-4	0	-8	*	0	/-12
PAL/PLO	0	-2	-14	-12	0	0	*	/-28
Freindly	0	+12	+2	+24	+2	+8	0	
Hostile	0	-4	-20	-15	-8	-17	-18	
Total	0	+8	-18	+9	-6	-9	-18	

MATRIX: 1979

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	+3	-6	-4	0	+2	+4	/-1
U.STATES	0	*	+4	+8	0	0	0	/+12
ISRAEL	+3	+16	*	+55	-7	0	-17	/+50
EGYPT	0	+11	+49	*	0	0	0	/+60
SYRIA	0	-2	-10	-4	*	0	0	/-16
LEBANON	+3	0	-2	0	-2	*	-2	/-3
PAL/PLO	+6	-2	-8	-9	0	+2	*	/-11
Freindly	+12	+30	+53	+63	0	0	+4	
Hostile	0	-4	-26	-17	-9	+4	-19	
Total	+12	+26	+27	+46	-9	+4	15	

(5)

MATRIX: 1980

Actors	U.NATIONS	U.STATES	ISRAEL	EGYPT	SYRIA	LEBANON	PAL/PLO	
U.NATIONS	*	0	-21	0	0	+3	+4	/-14
U.STATES	0	*	+2	+7	0	0	+3	/+12
ISRAEL	-11	+2	*	+20	-9	+2	-24	/-20
EGYPT	0	+3	+12	*	0	0	0	/+15
SYRIA	0	0	-10	-2	*	-4	0	/-16
LEBANON	0	0	0	0	-4	*	-4	/-8
PAL/PLO	0	0	-19	-2	0	-4	*	/-25
Freindly	0	+5	+14	+27	0	+5	+7	
Hostile	-11	0	-50	-4	-13	-8	-28	
Total	-11	+5	-36	+23	-13	-3	-21	

(6)

attitude shown by the matrices while Lebanon was reciprocating hostilities with one or more actors in its struggle for survival, the U.S. preoccupation with larger issues in the Middle East, solving the Palestinian problem and installing peace in that region between Israel and some Arab countries, resulted in an overall negative attitude towards Lebanon, "the real casualty of the step-by-step policy."10

It is this attitude that contributed to the crisis phase of 1975-76. Although the United States had not intended to be a destabilizing factor in the region, it contributed to Lebanon's instability prolonging the settlement of the Palestinian issue.

As a principal agent for stability in the Middle East Subordinate System, the United States had recognized the failure of its policy in Lebanon and worked to reestablish stability in Lebanon based on purely Lebanese structures. This action materialized in U.S. support for Lebanon's institutions, as well as in the UN Resolution 444, which mentioned the "strict respect of the Lebanese sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders."

CHAPTER VI

NOTES

[1]It was told on 12 November 1975 by State Department official Harold Saunders to a committee of the Congress (Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East Chronology 1975).

[2]WSAG: Washington Special Actions Group.

3Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheavals (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 462.

4Ibid., p. 196.

[5]See Chapter V, "Lebanese Attitudinal Prisms." In the Arab world leadership for peace is much more difficult than leadership for war. "Be not weary and faint hearted, crying for peace, when ye should be uppermost" (S. 47, v. 35). Therefore, the search for peace is a sign of weakness in most cases.

[6]Kissinger, Years of Upheavals, p. 788.

7Ibid.

[8]Ibid., 789.

9Ibid.

[10]William R. Polk, The Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 360.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Light at the End of the Tunnel

1. Lebanon's Individuality

Lebanon's individuality, a legacy from the past, had also been forged during the twentieth century throughout the mandate and the short stable period of Lebanon's independence, during the period of time the Lebanese widely enjoyed Western education and culture, adopted Western technology, and drove American cars. Christian and Muslim elites experienced the campus life of the American University of Beirut and found in its hospital medical care "par excellence." They even joined the two best golf clubs in the Arab world. On the other hand, Christians and Muslim Lebanese enjoyed a "laissez-faire" economy based on individual initiative and Lebanese skill. Lebanon's trade became dependent on the Western countries for imports, while having the Arab states as best clients. Lebanese technicians, engineers, and doctors spread all over the Arab world, dispensing their skill and knowledge to earn substantial profits. But within its internal structures, Lebanon was a dichotomy, not knowing whether it had a Western identity with an "Arab face" or an Arab identity with a "Western face." This dilemma exploded in 1958. The

Lebanese President asked for U.S. assistance, invoking the "Eisenhower Doctrine." Lebanon at this period of time had the most friendly relations with the United States, and this friendly attitude had the advantage of being supported by the majority of the Lebanese population.

2. Between Two Interventions

Since 1958, the relationship between the United States and Lebanon had been in a state of flux. U.S. interests and those of Lebanon merged most of the time. Both countries cherished the same values, as well as freedom. But Lebanon's image of the United States has always been distorted by the Lebanese Christian and Muslim attitudinal prisms, while the United States has shown consistency in its relation with Lebanon. This relationship in Lebanese perception materialized in the two major Lebanese crises of 1958 and 1975-76. Each crisis had several milestones over which most Lebanese built their images of the United States.

On 18 July, 1958 two days after the Lebanese government authorized President Chamoun to request foreign help, the U.S. President was asked publicly under what conditions he "might be prepared to take military action in connection with the Lebanese crisis?" The President answered that the action depended on the circumstances, and that as he understood them, he could not "be certain as to

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exactly what they are." President Eisenhower wanted to be certain whether Lebanon's independence was confronted by an overt communist threat. In the presidential message he sent to the U.S. forces in Lebanon, he clearly stated the purpose of that intervention on 19 July 1958:

> You are in Lebanon because the United States has responded to an urgent request from Lebanon, a friendly country, for help in preserving its cherished independence which has been gravely threatened. Lebanon is a free nation--properly proud of its history and its traditions. The Lebanese people--like us--want only to live in peace and in freedom. They do not want to impose their will on any other people; they do not want to conquer or enslave any other nation.

> But unfortunately, their hopes and aspirations to remain free are now threatened. A large part of that threat comes from outside forces which have sent men and munitions into Lebanon to help in destroying its democratic government, based upon free popular elections.

> Lebanon had no recourse but to appeal for assistance. Their President, with the unanimous approval of the Cabinet, asked me to help them maintain their independence. After careful consideration and consultation with the leaders of our Congress, I decided that the appeal for help had to be honored--that unless Lebanon received help, pending necessary enlarged United Nations support which could not be immediately furnished, it would cease to exist as a free and independent country.

> You are helping the Lebanese people to remain free.

> You are there at their invitation as friends to preserve for them the same freedoms that we have here at home.

> As soon as the independence and integrity of Lebanon are secure, then you and your comrades will be withdrawn immediately from the country."[1]

The American intervention was never quite understood by the Lebanese public. First, it was opposed by Lebanese Muslim factions as an extension of the imperialistic (sic) Eisenhower Doctrine. In fact, the Muslims in the Middle East were very conscious of the Algerian problems that pitted the Muslims against the West.[2] From their perspective, since the United States supported Israel (see precrisis 1958), and since they felt hostile towards the United States, they deeply believed that the United States, a predominantly Christian country, was going to reciprocate their hostility and destroy their sentiments of Arab Nationalism. What they failed to see was that the United States had placed its constitution, thus its acts and policy, under the motto "In God We Trust." He is the God of Abraham (Jewish), the Father (Christian) as well as the Almighty (Muslim). Therefore, no discrimination based on religious matters would be implemented in U.S. policy. The Muslim Lebanese were alarmingly surprised by the U.S. friendly attitude, which they interpreted as a sign of their own strength (not to say Nasser's strength) and superiority. They also failed to see that "Eisenhower Doctrine" was the policy of the U.S. President who stopped the tripartite invasion of Sinai and Port Said, and they failed to recognize that Nasser's opposition to that doctrine was more for Arab rivalry than anything else. Therefore, the Muslim Lebanese deeply believed that the United States was against

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Arab Nationalism. But in reality their conclusions were distorted and biased. The U.S. President on 6 August 1958 said:

> I believe in nationalism. This administration believes in nationalism. We believe it for ourselves, and we believe that any nation, any peoples, have the right to their independence. Indeed, it is because of our belief in the spirit of nationalism that we are in Lebanon today; . . .3 if the Arabs, as a whole, want to express their nationalism in the form of a federation of a larger state, we have no objection to that. As a matter of fact, we recognized very quickly the U.A.R. because of our belief in that.

Nationalism should be based on the concept of the nation-state as characterized by John Foster Dulles, former Secretary of State. A nation-state should have laws that "reflect the moral judgement of the community"; a political structure to revise the laws as needed; an executive to implement the laws; a judicial structure to resolve disputes according to the laws; a force to prevent violence by enforcing the law upon transgressors; and a sufficient social security to prevent people's violence by desperation.[4]

These were the main issues to implement in Lebanon after the Crisis of 1958 to build a Lebanese nation. Chamoun himself recognized that when he accepted the election of General Chehab, because the army would support him to deter violence. The Maronite Patriarch also supported Chehab. The Christians were dissatisfied when

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Chehab's government came from the opposition. But whom to blame? Did the U.S. forces in Lebanon take any action against the Christian "counterrevolution"? No, the political disagreement was settled internally: a "government of four" calmed the dispute. Lebanon's independence and integrity were maintained, but Lebanon's nationalism problem was not resolved. Did Lebanon need U.S. forces for that? The U.S. President advised his forces withdrawing from Lebanon:

> The need is past and you are now withdrawing. Two great lessons have been taught. First, the United States is a friend to those who wish to live their own lives in freedom. We are not deterred by threats or abuse from giving needed help. Second, the United States never seeks to turn the necessities of others into gains for itself.5

In fact, the Lebanese relations with the United States after 1958 were not as good as before. From Lebanese perception and reflected in the Middle East Subordinate System, the United States had no staying power with regards to Lebanon. Lebanon appeared trapped as in 1958, but the United States did nothing to counteract this pressure. In the intervening years between crises, American foreign policy toward Lebanon was one of omission. Only in time of crises was there any foreign policy at all. Lebanon abdicated its role in the Middle East and orbited in Nasser's sphere of influence. The new President worked to structure Lebanon's administrative institutions and to create a national consensus on military-security issues,

thus preserving the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. This sovereignty had been damaged since 1969, and in 1973 the Lebanese airport was not entirely under Lebanese control; Kissinger's airplane had to land in Rayak for security reasons. Lebanon the nation-state was nearly nonexistent, not only at the international level--the only time is manifested itself was to sponsor Yasser Arafat at the United Nations--but also at the internal setting of Lebanon as a state. The insufficient well-being of the people of southern Lebanon encouraged the ways of violence by desperation. The desperation of the Shi'a population squeezed between a devouring Palestinian presence in the south and their lack of land resources abounded in Beirut's suburbs. They merged with a detonating amalgam of Palestinians, communists, Ba'thists, Progressionists, and Socialists. Continuously exposed to ideologies denouncing imperialism, zionism, and isolationism, they formed under the leadership of Moussa-Sadr the "Amal" organization, which engulfed all the "have-nots." They manifested their support to Palestinian organizations and trained with them in arms and mines employment. Later they demonstrated in support of the Iranian revolution and its war against Iraq.

The Muslim Sunni leader had supported Nasserism since 1956, and this support was tolerated by Lebanese authorities and controlled by Nasser's Egypt. But when

Sadat replaced Nasser in the Presidency, the Nasserist organization continued to follow an ideology that Egypt itself had abandoned. They found in their alliance with the Palestinians the opportunity to implement their young leadership and an alibi to defy the law; as a matter of fact, the Melkart agreement remained "ink on paper" and was never implemented. Therefore, Lebanon of the seventies was unable to enforce the law on those who defied it. Furthermore, the law itself became a subject for disagreement; the army became the number one target, and others followed. In summary, the precrisis period showed all the signs of disintegration of Lebanon as a state.

On 13 April 1975, the clashes between the Palestinians and the Phalanges took a wide amplitude. After a few "rounds" of fightings followed by unsuccessful settlements, the two factions of the residents in Lebanon organized themselves. The Muslim organizations and the Palestinians formed the "national front" under the leadership of Kamal Junblat, head of the socialist party, who dreamed of establishing in Lebanon a socialist government without confessional considerations. It was Junblat's leadership and Muslim support that gave the war of 1975-76 its image of civil war between Lebanese factions. In fact, it was the Palestinians, supported by "have-not," Muslims, who attempted to take over Lebanon. The "Lebanese Front," predominantly Christian, based on the Phalange Party

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of Pierre Gemayel and the Liberal National Party of Chamoun, was supported by other paramilitary organizations, such as the "Tanzim" (organization) and the "Guardians of the Cedars." The Lebanese Front refused and opposed Palestinian objectives. It attracted almost all Christians and some Shi'a and Druze support in the final phases of the combat. The Lebanese Front materialized Lebanese individuality in its arabity and Western values, while the National Front advocated Islam and Pan-Arabism; the will of the Lebanese Front and the leadership of the Lebanese forces later materialized in Bashir Gemayel. Leader of the Lebanese forces, he also opposed Syrian hegemony. It was the determination of the Lebanese not to leave their country and their willingness to fight for their identity that corrected the U.S. perception about the situation in Lebanon.

The United States, since the aftermath of the Vietnam War, has been reluctant to be directly involved in internal conflicts in the Middle East and especially in Lebanon, where the war took on an aspect of conflict between confessions. The determination of the Lebanese to remain in their country proved one more time that Palestinian propaganda was much more efficient than Lebanese weak diplomacy during the seventies. The United States, aware of the Lebanese realities, supported Lebanon's independence, integrity, and sovereignty with more faith and conviction.

There was no change in feelings of the United States toward Lebanon nor in its policy to bring peace to the Middle East Subordinate System. But a change in thrust towards solving the Middle East problem occurred with the new administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. The problem of the Middle East would be solved, while respecting territorial and political integrity of Lebanon.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon was a catalyst for closer relations between the United States and Lebanon. The second landing of Marines in Beirut, almost two decades after the first one, took place among unanimous approval of the Arab world. It is worth noting that no one but the United States could initiate the departure of the PLO fighters from Beirut and restore the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the continuity of its political structure. President-elect Bashir Gemayel understood that fact, as did his elder brother, President Amine Gemayel, who was entrusted by all Lebanese to carry on Bashir's mission after he was assassinated a few days before he was to take office. President Gemayel's first significant diplomatic move was to visit the United States and meet its President. It was the first visit of a Lebanese President to the President of the United States. During this short visit, President Gemayel expressed the feelings of the Lebanese people towards the people of the United States, its armed forces, and its

administration, when he said to the U.S. President, "you are the light at the end of the tunnel."

After the meeting, members of the Phalangist Party stated that they were "very reassured," while Gemayel described the meeting with President Reagan as "excellent."

President Reagan, who considered that the "Vietnam Syndrome" had imposed restraints on the use of U.S. military abroad in peacekeeping missions, was willing to take risks and to send more troops to Lebanon, if it would solve Lebanon's current problems. The United States had already committed $110 million as security assistance to rebuild Lebanon's army. The Reagan administration considered Lebanon "the essential issue to get solved" before the United States could "go on with the rest of the peace process," in the Middle East Subordinate System. In fact, the U.S. troops who came to Lebanon were allowed to remain as long as their presence in Lebanon was needed. A survey team had also been dispatched to Lebanon and proposed a Lebanese armed forces of at least eight brigades equiped with U.S. weapons and materiel. Such propositions matched Lebanese wishes to build a strong army that would maintain Lebanon's independence. It would collaborate with U.S. military to preserve Lebanon's individuality and U.S. interests. This Lebanese-U.S. connection should be the strongest and the most genuine collaboration. It has its

roots in the mutual values cherished by both the Lebanese and the U.S. people. In fact, the genuineness of Lebanon's feelings towards the United States and all its allies had materialized in the tendencies of its people. The Lebanese people made that clear when it supported Bashir Gemayel's leadership and again when the people's representatives unanimously elected Amine Gemayel, a leader of the Lebanese Phalange Party, to be President of all Lebanese. The U.S. relations with Lebanon are at a new crossroads directed along a path of common interests of peace and stability in the Middle East. Will this new relationship endure? That will depend very much on the ability of Lebanon's government to maintain itsunique personality and to exploit the American presence for the good of all Lebanese as a whole and not for partisan purposes. It will also depend on the staying power and firm commitment of the United States toward Lebanon. The United States must not view Lebanon as simply another Middle East pawn to be abused, ignored or exploited for an immediate advantage, real or impuned. Clearly the future of peace and stability in the Middle East has an important Lebanese dimension which cannot be secured by the patchwork relations characteristic of the past.

CHAPTER VII

NOTES

[1] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1958, section 176.

[2] Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 160. The French "Cremieux law gave Algerian Jews a special privilege not granged to Moslems (Muslims), the right to automatic French citizenship at birth. Moslems native to Algeria could acquire such citizenship only by formally applying for it and by renouncing their religion."

[3] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1958, section 198, p. 591.

[4] U.S. Department of State Bulletin no. 34 (7 May 1956), p. 740.

[5] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1958.

ANNEX

THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION*

First Amendment: 17 October 1927.

Second Amendment: 8 May 1929.

Third Amendment: 18 March 1943, by decree from the French delegate; the Constitutional Law (C.L.), 21 January 1947, adopted by the Parliament is used in this translation.

Fourth Amendment: 9 November 1943.

Title 1--FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Lebanon is an independent state, unitarian and sovereign, (4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 1).   Its frontiers are those which now limit it:

In the North: from the mouth of Nahr al Kabir, a line following the course of this river up to its junction with its tributary Wadi Khaled at the height of Jisr al Kamar.

In the East: the top line separating the valleys of Wadi Khaled and Wadi Nahr-al Asi (Orontes) and passing through the villages of Meaysra, Harbaana, Hait, Ebbesh, Faisan, at the height of the villages of Brifa and Matraba. This line follows the northern limit of the caza of Baalbeck, the northwest-southeast direction, then the eastern limits of the cazas of Baalbeck, Bikaa, Rashaya, and Hasbaya.

In the South: the present southern limits of the cazas of Tyre and Marjeyun.

In the West: the Mediterranean Sea.

*The author assumes responsibility for this translation based primarily on the original French text when its Arabic version lacked clarity.

Article 2

No part of the Lebanese territory may be alienated or ceded.

Article 3

Limits of the administrative districts may not be modified except by law.

Article 4

Greater Lebanon is a Republic. Beirut is its capital city.

Article 5

(C.L., 7 December 1943, sole article) The Lebanese flag is composed of three horizontal stripes; two red ones framing a white one. The height of the white stripe equals twice the height of each red stripe. In the center of the white stripe figures a green cedar, the width of which occupies the third of the white stripe; the Cedar, at its top and base, touches each of the red stripes.

CHAPTER 2 - THE LEBANESE, THEIR RIGHTS AND THEIR DUTIES

Article 6

The Lebanese nationality, the way it is acquired, retained, and forfeited, shall be determined by law.

Article 7

All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges and duties, without any distinction whatever.

Article 8

Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected. No one can be arrested or detained except in accordance with

the provisions of the law. No infringements and no sanctions can be established except by law.

Article 9

Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious interests.

Article 10

Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order and to good manners and does not touch the dignity of creeds. No derogation shall affect the right of communities to have their schools, subject to the general prescriptions on public education edicted by the State.

Article 11

(4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 2) Arabic is the official national language. A law shall determine the cases where the French language is to be used.

Article 12

All the Lebanese citizens are equally admitted to all public functions without any other cause for preference except their merit and competence and according to the conditions set by law. A special statute shall govern Civil Servants according to the administrations to which they belong.

Article 13

Freedom of expression by word or pen, freedom of the press, freedom of holding meetings and freedom of association are equally guaranteed within the limits of the law.

Article 14

Domicile is inviolable. None can enter it except in cases provided by the law and according to the form it prescribes.

Article 15

Property is under the protection of the law. None may be deprived of his property except for public utility, in cases established by the law and in return of prior and fair compensation.

TITLE II. - POWERS

CHAPTER I - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 16

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 1) Legislature lies with a single assembly: the Chamber of Deputies.

Article 17

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 2) Executive power is entrusted to the President of the Republic who exercises it with the assistance of Ministers, according to conditions established by the present constitution.

Article 18

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 50) Initiative for legislation belongs to the President of the Republic and to the Chamber of Deputies.

Article 19

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 50) In order that a law may be promulgated, it must have been voted by the Chamber.

Article 20

Judicial power, functioning within the framework of a statute established by law and ensuring guarantees to judges and to the disputing parties, is exercised by courts of different orders and degrees. The law fixes the limits and the conditions of the magistrates' immutability. Judges are independent in the exercise of their functions. The awards and judgments of all courts are rendered and executed in the name of the Lebanese people.

Article 21

Any Lebanese citizen aged 21 who meets the conditions of the electoral law is entitled to vote.

CHAPTER 2 - THE LEGISLATURE

Article 22

(Abrogated by 1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 50)

Article 23

(Abrogated by 1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 50.)

Article 24

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) The Chamber of Deputies is composed of elected members: their number and conditions of their election are determined by the electoral laws in force.

Article 25

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) In the event of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, the deed dissolving it must contain convocation of the voters for new elections which shall be held in conformity with Article 24 and within a time limit not exceeding three months.

CHAPTER 3 - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 26

The Chamber and the Executive sit in Beirut.

Article 27

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) The Member of Parliament represents all the Nation. No imperative mandate may be given to him by his electors.

Article 28

(2d Amend., C.L., 8 May 1929, Art. 1) No incompatibility exists between deputy's mandate and ministerial office. Ministers may be taken indistinctively either from the Chamber or from outside.

Article 29

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 6) Cases of inaptness for deputation are determined by law.

Article 30

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) The Chamber of Deputies is solely competent to judge the validity of its members' mandate. No mandate may be invalidated except by a two-thirds majority vote of the entire Assembly.

Article 31

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 8) Any sitting of the Chamber outside the legal time of session is illicit and null by rights.

Article 32

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 9) The Chamber convenes every year in two ordinary sessions. The first opens on the first Tuesday following the fifteenth of March and terminates at the end of the month of May. The second opens on the first Tuesday following the fifteenth of

October. It is devoted before any other business to budget debate and vote. It lasts until the end of the year.

Article 33

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 10) The opening and closure of ordinary sessions take place by rights on the dates fixed by Article 32.

The President of the Republic may convene the Chamber to an extraordinary session. Opening and closure of extraordinary sessions are fixed by decree.

The agenda of the extraordinary session is fixed by the decree of convocation.

The President of the Republic is bound to convene the Chamber of Deputies, if so requested by the absolute majority of its members.

Article 34

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 11) The Chamber may not be validly constituted but with the attendance of the majority of the members legally composing it.

Resolutions are adopted by majority vote. In the event of a tie the matter under debate is rejected.

Article 35

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 12) Debates in the Chamber are public. However, the Chamber convenes in secret committee upon the request of the Government or of five members of Parliament. It then decides if the debate must be resumed in public on the same subject.

Article 36

Voting is expressed in a loud voice or by sitting and standing, except in the event of an election, in which case ballot is secret. On laws as a whole and on the matter of confidence, voting is always by nominal call and in a loud voice.

Article 37

(2d Amend., C.L., 8 May 1929, Art. 2) The right of every deputy to question the responsibility of Ministers is absolute during the ordinary and extraordinary sessions.

No motion of this nature may be debated and voted upon except five days at least after it has been tabled* before the Chamber of Deputies and communicated to the Minister or Ministers concerned.

Article 38

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 14) Any bill which has not been rejected by the Chamber may not be tabled once more in the course of the same session.

Article 39

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 15) No member of the Chamber may be prosecuted or wanted for opinions or votes expressed by him during the term of his mandate.

Article 40

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 16) No member of the Chamber may, while the session is in progress, be prosecuted or arrested for breach of the penal law but with the authorization of the Chamber, barring cases of flagrante delicto.

Article 41

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) When a seat in the Chamber has become vacant, the vacancy shall be filled within a time limit of two months. The term of office of the new member shall run up to the expiry of the term of office of his predecessor.

No steps shall be taken to fill the vacancy if the Chamber is less than six months away from the expire of its powers.

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*Table used in British sense of to bring up for discussion.

Article 42

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) General elections for the renewal of the Assembly are held within the sixty days which precede the end of its term of office.

Article 43

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Jan. 1927, Art. 19) The Chamber drafts its own internal regulations.

Article 44

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) At the first sitting which follows every renewal and on the opening of the October session, the Chamber meeting under the presidency of it doyen of age, the two youngest members acting as secretaries, elects separately by secret ballot and the absolute majority of the expressed votes, a president (Speaker), a vice-president, and two secretaries. At the third ballot, relative majority is sufficient.

In the event of a tie, the oldest candidate is declared elected.

Article 45

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 21) The members of the Chamber do not have vote except if they attend the sitting; voting by proxy is not admitted.

Article 46

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 22) Only the Chamber is entitled to maintain its own order, through the Speaker.

Article 47

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 23) Any petition to the Chamber must be made out and communicated in writing. It is forbidden to hand in petitions in person or on the floor.

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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Article 48

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 24) Indemnity to the members of the Chamber is determined by law.

CHAPTER 4 - THE EXECUTIVE

Article 49

(2d Amend., C.L., 8 May 1929, Art. 3, and 3d Amend., C.L., 21 January 1947, Art. 2) The President of the Republic is elected by secret ballot at a two-thirds majority of the votes, by the Chamber of Deputies. After the first ballot, absolute majority suffices. The President's term of office is of six years. He may not be re-elected except after a break of six years.

None is eligible as President of the Republic if he does not meet the conditions required to be eligible to the Chamber of Deputies.

Article 50

Before entering upon his duties, the President of the Republic takes the oath of allegiance to the Lebanese Nation and to the Constitution, before Parliament, in the following terms:

"I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Lebanese people, to safeguard the independence of Lebanon and the integrity of its territory."

Article 51

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 26) The President of the Republic promulgates laws when they have been voted by the Chamber; he sees to their execution; he is vested with regulating powers though he may not modify the laws themselves nor exempt from their execution.

He has the power of pardon. Amnesty may not be granted except by law.

Article 52

(4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 3) The President of the Lebanese Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties. He brings them to the knowledge of the Chamber as soon as the interest and the safety of the State permit.

Treaties involving State finances, trade agreements, and, in general, treaties that cannot be denounced at the end of each calendar year are not definitive except after they have been voted by the Chamber of Deputies.

Article 53

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) The President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the Ministers among whom he designates a President for the Council of Ministers; he nominates to all posts for which the mode of appointment is not otherwise determined by law; he presides over national official functions.

Article 54

Each of the acts of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned, except, however, in the case of the nomination or revocation of Ministers.

Article 55

(2d Amend., C.L., 8 May 1929, Art. 4) The President of the Republic may, by motivated decree taken on the favorable advice of the Council of Ministers, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, before the expiry of its term of office.

In this case, the electing bodies are gathered as provided in article 25 and the new Chamber is convened within the fifteen clear days following the proclamation of the election results.

Article 56

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 30) The President of the Republic promulgates laws within the calendar month which follows the communication to the Government of the law definitively passed; he must

promulgate within five clear days those laws whose promulgation has been declared a matter of urgency by special vote of the Chamber.

Article 57

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 31) Within the time limit fixed for promulgation, the President of the Republic may ask once for a new debate which may not be denied him.

When the President of the Republic uses this right, he is not bound to promulgate a law unless this law has been passed by the Chamber after a second debate by absolute majority of the members legally composing this Assembly.

Article 58

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 32) By decree already taken on the favorable advice of the Council of Ministers, the President of the Republic may render executory any project which has previously been declared urgent by the Government by the decree of transmission taken on the favorable advice of the Council of Ministers, and on which the Chamber has not adjudicated within the forty days following its communication to the Assembly.

Article 59

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 33) The President of the Republic may adjourn the Chamber for a period not exceeding one month. He may not do so twice in the same session.

Article 60

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) The President of the Republic is not responsible for the acts of his functions except in cases of breach to the Constitution or high treason.

His responsibility for offences of common law is submitted to ordinary laws.

For such offences, as for breach of the Constitution and high treason he may not be impeached except by the Chamber of Deputies deciding by a two-thirds majority of the

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members of the whole Assembly; he is tried by the Higher Court provided in Article 80. Public prosecutorship before the Higher Court is exercised by a magistrate appointed by the highest jurisdiction, with all the chambers meeting.

Article 61

When indicted the President of the Republic is suspended of his functions and the Presidency is vacant until the Higher Court adjudicates.

Article 62

In case of vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic, for whatever reason this may be, executive power is exercised, provisionally, by the Council of Ministers.

Article 63

The civil list of the President of the Republic is determined by law. During the President's tenure of office it may be neither increased nor reduced.

Article 64

Ministers assume the higher management of all the State services pertaining to their respective departments. Each, within his competence, sees to the enforcement of the laws and regulations.

Article 65

No one may be a Minister if he is not a Lebanese.

Article 66

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 34) Ministers are severally responsible before the Chamber for the Government general policy and individually for their personal acts. The Government's overall program is prepared and presented to the Chamber by the President of the Council or by a Minister acting in his name.

Article 67

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 35) Ministers may come to the Chamber without let or hindrance and make themselves heard whenever they please. They may seek the assistance of one or several Civil Servants of their department.

Article 68

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 36) When, in conformity with article 37, the Chamber declares it has no confidence in a Minister, this Minister is required to resign.

Article 69

(Abrogated by 2d Amend., C.L., 8 May 1929, Art. 5)

Article 70

The Chamber of Deputies is entitled to arraign Ministers for high treason or for serious dereliction of their incumbent duties. Committal for trial may not be decided except by a *two-thirds* majority of the whole Assembly. A special law shall determine the civil responsibility of Ministers.

Article 71

The Minister committed for trial is judged by the Higher Court.

Article 72

The Minister relinquishes his post as soon as he has been committed for trial. A Minister's resignation does not preclude the initiation or pursuance of proceedings against him.

TITLE III.

a) ## ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Article 73

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 38) At least one month and at most two months before the expiry of the powers of the President of the Republic, the Chamber convenes, on the invitation of its Speaker, for the election of a new President.

In default of a convocation, the meeting shall be held by rights the tenth day before the end of the President's term of office.

Article 74

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 39) Should the presidency become vacant through death, resignation, or any other cause, the Assembly meets immediately and by rights to elect a new President. If at the time the vacancy occurs, the Chamber happens to be dissolved, the electoral bodies are summoned without delay and, soon after the elections are held, the Chamber meets by right.

Article 75

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 40) The Chamber meeting to elect the President of the Republic constitutes an electing body, not a deliberating body.

It must proceed solely, without delay or debate, with the election of the Head of the State.

b) ## REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Article 76

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 41) The Constitution may be revised on the initiative of the President of the Republic.

In this event, the government shall table before the Assembly a draft constitutional law.

Article 77

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 42) The Constitution may equally be revised on the initiative of the Chamber of Deputies. This right is exercised in the following manner:

In the course of an ordinary session and on the proposal of at least ten of its members, the Chamber may voice the desire, by a two-thirds majority of the members legally composing it, that the Constitution should be revised. The articles and questions covered by this desire are to be specifically enumerated and clarified.

The Speaker conveys the wish to the Government, requesting it to lay down a draft constitutional law.

If the Government approves the Assembly's desire, it must prepare the relevant draft law and table it before the Assembly within four months; if the Government is at variance with the Assembly, its desire is sent back for a further deliberation. If the Chamber maintains its desire at a three-quarters majority of the members legally composing it, the President of the Republic is at liberty either to acquiese to the Assembly's desire or to issue a decree of dissolution and take steps for new elections within a time limit of three months.

Should the new Assembly insist on the need for revision, the Government is compelled to acquiesce to the wish of the Assembly and to table a draft law within a time limit of four months.

c) **OPERATION OF THE CHAMBER**

Article 78

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 43) When the draft constitutional law has been tabled before it, the Chamber must engage itself in no other business but that of revision, until the final vote.

It may not deliberate and vote except on those articles and issues which have been set down for the sake of limitation and clarified in the project duly communicated.

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Article 79

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 44) The Chamber of Deputies, with a draft constitutional law before it, may not validly deliberate and vote except when a two-thirds majority of the members legally composing it attend. Deliberations are carried by a two-thirds majority of the members legally composing the Assembly.

The President of the Republic is bound to promulgate the constitutional law in the same conditions and forms as ordinary laws. He may within the time limit fixed for promulgation, require a new deliberation. This shall equally be proceeded with by a two-thirds majority.

TITLE IV. VARIOUS PROVISIONS

a) THE SUPREME COURT

Article 80

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 45) The Supreme Court is composed of seven deputies elected and by eight of the highest Lebanese magistrates, selected by order of hierarchy or, at equal rank, by order of seniority, under the chairmanship of the top grade magistrate.

Verdicts of condemnation by the Supreme Court are rendered by a majority of ten votes. A law shall determine the procedure to be followed in this Court.

b) FINANCE

Article 81

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) Taxes are established for public use. No taxes may be levied in the Lebanese Republic except in conformity with a uniform law applicable on the whole territory without exception.

Article 82

No tax may be modified or suppressed except by virtue of a law.

Article 83

Every year, early in the October session, the Government submits to the Chamber of Deputies, for examination and approval, the general budget of State revenue and expenditure for the following year. The budget is voted article by article.

Article 84

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 46) In the course of the budget debate and the discussion of the Bills providing for the opening of supplementary and emergency credits, the Chamber may not increase the credits proposed in the draft budget or in the above mentioned projects, either through amendment or through independent proposals. But once this debate is over, the Assembly may pass laws providing for new expenditures.

Article 85

(3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 1) No emergency credit may be opened except by special law.

However, when unpredictable circumstances have made urgent expenditures necessary, the President of the Republic may, by decree passed on the favorable advice of the Council of Ministers, open emergency or supplementary credits, or operate credit transfers. Such credits may not exceed 15,000 pounds per article.

The measures so edicted are submitted to the ratification of the Chamber at the first session following.

Article 86

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 October 1927, Art. 48) If the Chamber of Deputies has not definitively dealt with the draft project before the expiry of the session devoted to the examination of the budget, the President of the Republic shall summon the Assembly to an extraordinary session expiring at the end of January to proceed with the budget debate; if at the end of that extraordinary session the budget has not been finalized, the President of the Republic may, by decree passed on the favorable advice of the Council

of Ministers, make the draft budget executory in the form in which it was tabled before the Chamber.

The President may not exercise this power except if the draft budget has been tabled before the Chamber at least fifteen days before the beginning of the session.

In the course of that extraordinary session, taxes, contributions, duties, fees, and other revenue continue to be levied as previously.

The expenditures of the month of January are initiated on the basis of the provisional twelfth of the preceding financial year, increased by permanent additional credits, and reduced by the permanent credits withdrawn.

Article 87

(1st Amend., C.L., 17 Oct. 1927, Art. 49) The final account of the finance administration for the closed financial year must be submitted to the Chamber and approved before the promulgation of the budget of the second financial year following that to which the account refers. An Audit Department shall be created by special law.

Article 88

No public loan and no commitment likely to burden the Treasury may be transacted except by virtue of a law.

Article 89

No concession aiming at the exploitation of a natural resource of the country or a public utility service, nor any monopoly may be granted except by virtue of a law and for a limited period.

TITLE V

Article 90

(Abrogated by 4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 4)

Article 91

(Abrogated by 4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 4)

Article 92

(Abrogated by 4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 4)

Article 93

(Abrogated by 3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 2)

Article 94

(Abrogated by 4th Amend., C.L., Nov. 1943, Art. 4)

TITLE VI. - FINAL AND TRANSITOR ᴾOVISIONS

Article 95

(4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 5) As a
transitory measure and for the sake of justice and concord,
the communities shall be equitably represented in public
posts and in ministerial composition, without damage to
State interest resulting therefrom.

Articles 96, 97, 98, 99, and 100

(Abrogated by 3d Amend., C.L., 21 Jan. 1947, Art. 2)

Article 101

As from 1 September 1926, the State of "Greater
Lebanon" shall bear the name of "Lebanese Republic," without
change or modification of any other kind.

Article 102

(4th Amend., C.L., 9 Nov. 1943, Art. 6) All
legislative provisions contrary to the present constitution
are abrogated.

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